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FOREIGN AUTHORITY, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM, AND THE
DRED SCOTT CASE
SARAH H. CLEVELAND*
"La situation des Am~ricains est donc entitrement exceptionnelle, et il
est 6 croire qu 'aucun people ddmocratique n 'y sera jamais plac . "I
-Alexis de Tocqueville, 2 De La Dcmocratie En Amdrique, Ch. IX
INTRODUCTION
At least since Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1831, the idea that
America is distinctive from other nations has permeated much political and
social commentary. The United States has been variously perceived as
unique in its history, its culture, its national values, its social movements,
and its social and political institutions. While the term technically refers
only to distinctiveness or difference, "exceptionalism" may have positive
or negative aspects-what Harold Koh has called "America's Jekyll-and-
Hyde exceptionalism. ' '2 In the legal realm, claims of exceptionalism have
been offered to support what Michael Ingnatieff identifies as "legal isola-
tionism"-or refusal by domestic courts to consider foreign practices and
international legal rules in the construction of U.S. law. 3
Arguments from American exceptionalism currently are particularly
acute in the context of constitutional adjudication. Proponents of the excep-
tionalist position justify "legal isolationism" on the grounds that the U.S.
system of government is sufficiently distinct from other national practices
* Marrs McLean Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law; Bemis Visiting Profes-
sor of International Law, Harvard Law School. A.B. 1987, Brown University; M.St. 1989, Oxford
University; J.D. 1992, Yale Law School. This project has benefited from the thoughtful comments of
Paul Finkelman, Mark Graber, Randall Kennedy, Sanford Levinson, William Marshall, Gerald Neu-
man, Louise Weinberg, and the participants at the International Law Workshop at Harvard Law School
and the Dred Scott 150th Anniversary Symposium at the University of Texas School of Law. Gratitude
is also due to the Harvard Law School librarians and to the editors of the Chicago-Kent Law Review for
their support and assistance.
I. The passage may be translated as "the situation of the Americans is entirely exceptional, and
there is reason to believe that no other democratic people will ever enjoy anything like it." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 517-18 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2004).
2. Harold Hongju Koh, America's Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS I l, Il1 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005).
3. Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, in AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 8, 11.
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and international rules to render foreign rules irrelevant to constitutional
analysis. And at its origins, the U.S. legal system was understood to be
distinctive in at least three ways. The design of the national government as
a government of limited, delegated powers governed by a written Constitu-
tion was something new under the sun at the time the Constitution was
adopted, and clearly set the U.S. governmental system apart from the au-
thoritarian systems of Europe. Likewise, the Framers' decision to "split the
atom of sovereignty" 4 and allocate sovereign powers among the national
government, the states, and the people created a distinctively American
system of federalism with no direct foreign analogue. Finally, the design
and content of most, if not all, of the individual protections in the U.S. Bill
of Rights are frequently viewed as the product of a unique American politi-
cal heritage. A national government of limited and delegated powers, fed-
eralism, and fundamental individual rights thus form core elements of the
American exceptionalist narrative.
Justice Scalia, for example, has argued that comparative analysis is in-
appropriate in construing U.S. federalism principles, since the Framers
established a distinctly American federal system.5 He also has rejected
consideration of international and foreign authority in individual rights
contexts, asserting the uniqueness of American practices with respect to
free speech, the right to jury trial, the exclusionary rule, the death penalty,
and abortion, among others. 6 Justice Scalia accordingly has argued that
"modem foreign legal materials can never be relevant to an interpretation
of... the meaning of ... the U.S. Constitution."'7
The extreme exceptionalist position has led to the introduction of leg-
islation in Congress such as the Constitutional Preservation Resolution,
which expressed the sense of the House that "the Supreme Court should
base its decisions on the Constitution and the Laws of the United States,
and not on the law of any foreign country or any international law or
agreement not made under the authority of the United States."'8 Other
commentators have expressed concern about the legitimacy of judicial
decision making if foreign authorities are consulted. Thus, scholars have
warned that consideration of foreign authorities would "expand" the
"canon" of "authoritative materials" considered valid in constitutional deci-
4. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
5. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.I 1 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624-27 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. Antonin Scalia, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Keynote Address: Foreign Legal
Authority in the Federal Courts, in 98 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 305, 307 (2004).
8. H.R. Res. 446, 108th Cong. (2003).
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sion making.9 The possibility of opening a Pandora's box of new sources of
law in domestic adjudication raises "integrity-anxiety" about preserving the
sanctity of American constitutional discourse.10
Proponents of considering foreign authority in U.S. constitutional
analysis, led prominently by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg and former Jus-
tice O'Connor, in turn have argued that it makes good sense in the modem
era to look to foreign practices for possible solutions to vexing legal ques-
tions. The rise of foreign constitutional systems based on the American
model, the proliferation of foreign constitutional courts that are adjudicat-
ing similar questions, the rise of international human rights law as a com-
mon standard of acceptable conduct, and globalization all have increased
the pressures, and the opportunities, for looking to foreign authority for
persuasive guidance in the resolution of shared problems. In a global com-
munity, in other words, judges need a transnational perspective. In various
modem contexts, Justices have looked to international law and comparative
foreign practices with respect to constitutional issues of separation of pow-
ers, I I federalism,12 and individual rights. 13 Implicit, though generally not
explicit, in this position is an assumption that many U.S. legal practices,
and even many U.S. constitutional practices, are not so distinctive from the
rest of the world as to render international approaches irrelevant.
Against the above background, when rereading the Dred Scott deci-
sion one is struck by the extent to which the Justices relied upon interna-
tional and foreign legal authority 14 to support their positions. In all, seven
members of the Court, including the Chief Justice, explicitly looked to
foreign authority in considering aspects of the case. The other two mem-
bers of the Court-Justices Wayne and Grier-joined opinions that refer-
9. Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 807,
819 (2000).
10. Frank 1. Michelman, Integrity-Anxiety?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS,
supra note 2, at 241, 264-65.
11. In his famous concurrence in the Steel Seizure case, Justice Jackson looked to the practices of
Britain, France, and Weimar Germany to conclude that any effective check on executive power required
placing the nation's emergency powers in Congress. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer
(Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 651-52 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
12. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (observing that
foreign approaches to federalism may "cast an empirical light" on constitutional interpretation, as one
consideration among many).
13. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-78 (2005) (Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-77 (2003) (homosexual sodomy).
14. International law and comparative foreign laws and practices are separate legal sources that
raise distinct issues in constitutional analysis. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution,
31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 10-11 (2006) (discussing the distinction between interpretation based on interna-
tional and comparative law). For purposes here, however, I use "foreign" to refer to either form of
authority.
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enced foreign authority. Given the decision's arguable status as "the most
reviled opinion in American judicial history,"' 15 it is not surprising that
Dred Scott has become a poster child for modem critics of the use of for-
eign authority in judicial analysis. Critics of the practice point to Dred
Scott, together with Reynolds v. United States and Roe v. Wade, to argue
that the Court has cited foreign authority "in some of its most problematic
opinions,"' 16 and condemn the use of foreign sources in these cases as signs
of "illegitimate policymaking."' 17 Scholars point to Chief Justice Taney's
reliance on foreign practice to conclude that blacks could not be citizens as
a cautionary warning that reliance on foreign authority can "produce results
that... we abhor."'18 Justice Ginsburg likewise has criticized Chief Justice
Taney's reification of foreign attitudes toward blacks at the Framing as an
interpretive methodology that is "frozen-in-time."l 9
This article explores the use of foreign authorities in the various opin-
ions in Dred Scott in search of lessons for the contemporary debate. The
article first examines the role of international and comparative legal argu-
ments in pre-Civil War slavery cases. The article then turns to four issues
in which foreign authorities were raised in the case: (1) whether blacks
could be citizens within the meaning of the Court's Article III diversity
jurisdiction ("the citizenship question"); (2) whether choice-of-law princi-
ples obligated Missouri to recognize freedom that Scott might have ac-
quired in another jurisdiction ("the choice-of-law question"); (3) whether
Congress possessed legal authority to invalidate slavery in the territories
pursuant to the Article IV Territory Clause ("the Territory question"); 20 and
finally (4) whether Fifth Amendment due process nevertheless prevented
Congress from abolishing "property" rights in slaves ("the due process
question"). International or comparative law arguments were posed in each
of these contexts, often on both sides of the question.
15. Sanford Levinson, Superb History, Dubious Constitutional and Political Theory: Comments
on Uviller and Merkel, The Militia and the Right to Arms, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 315, 327
(2004); see also Mark A. Graber, Desperately Ducking Slavery: Dred Scott and Contemporary Consti-
tutional Theory, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 271-72 (1997) (collecting modem scholarly and judicial
criticism of the case).
16. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 743, 755 (2005).
17. Id. at 756.
18. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources To Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J.
INT'L L. 57, 69 & n.94 (2004) (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 410 (1857)).
19. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., "A Decent Respect to the
Opinions of [Human]kind": The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication
(Apr. 1,2005), in 99 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 351, 355 (2005).
20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (authorizing Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States... ").
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The article closes with observations regarding the lessons that may be
drawn from Dred Scott for the modem debate over American exceptional-
ism and the use of foreign authority. The article concludes that the critics'
focus on the use of foreign authority in the case is misguided. It was not the
use of foreign authority that opened Dred Scott to condemnation, or that led
the members of the Court to reach a "political" decision. The members of
the Court frequently agreed on the relevance of foreign authorities to their
analysis, though those authorities were subject to interpretation and to some
extent were in a state of flux. Neither foreign authority nor domestic au-
thority offered the Justices easy solutions. The case nevertheless demon-
strates that foreign authority was a valued sounding board for the Court
well before the modem era of globalization. The debates in Dred Scott-
constitutional and otherwise-thus offer a robust nineteenth-century exam-
ple of transnational judicial discourse. 21
This is not to say that arguments from American exceptionalism did
not appear. To the contrary, Justices did assert the distinctiveness of
American law in some contexts. All members of the Court agreed that
Congress's powers to govern the territories were defined by the Constitu-
tion, rather than by international law free of constitutional constraint. Chief
Justice Taney adopted a particularly extreme exceptionalist position with
respect to the due process question, to hold that Congress lacked constitu-
tional power to abolish slavery in the territories. The assertions of U.S.
exceptionalism, however, were made on a retail rather than wholesale ba-
sis. No member of the Court adopted a blanket position that foreign law
and practice were irrelevant to domestic legal questions.
Finally, the case demonstrates that exceptionalism, no less than trans-
nationalism, is capable of opportunistic use. On the citizenship question,
Chief Justice Taney and Justice Daniel badly misrepresented foreign au-
thority to hold that "universal" opinion at the time of the Framing denied
citizenship to free blacks. With respect to the due process question, the
Chief Justice then staked out a stridently exceptionalist position to hold that
abolishing slavery in the territories was a taking of property in violation of
due process. In so doing, Taney both ignored contrary evidence regarding
the meaning of due process at the time of the Framing and forcefully op-
posed prevailing international trends against the institution of slavery. The
decision thus stands as a warning that a blind refusal to consider foreign
norms may be as fraught with hazards as their indiscriminate use.
21. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. RICH. L.
REV. 99, 101 (1994) (discussing theory of"transjudicial communication").
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I. FOREIGN AUTHORITY AND THE ANTEBELLUM SLAVERY DEBATE
International and comparative law played an important role in pre-
Civil War slavery debates, both in the courts and elsewhere. Slavery and
the slave trade were international phenomena in the early to mid-nineteenth
century. International cooperation was critical to efforts to abolish the slave
trade, and formal treaties promoting cooperation in this effort were entered
between Great Britain and various European powers. Moreover, both aboli-
tionism and proslavery efforts were transborder movements, with advocates
on both sides of the issue drawing strength and inspiration from develop-
ments in Europe, and particularly in Great Britain.22
Slavery's status under international law was evolving rapidly during
this period, with growing recognition of slavery's invalidity as nations
gradually abolished slavery and condemned the slave trade as piracy. The
United States prohibited the slave trade in 1808, and slavery and the slave
trade were outlawed in various European and colonial jurisdictions during
the antebellum period. By the mid-1700s, French courts were holding that
slavery could not exist in France, and the French Code Noir governed the
rights of slaveholders from French colonies who wanted to bring slaves
into France. 23 Napoleon declared the trade abolished for France in 1815,24
and France ultimately prohibited slavery in its colonies in 1848.25 Great
Britain abolished the slave trade in 1807, denounced the trade as piracy in
1824, prohibited slavery throughout the British Empire in 1833, and pro-
hibited the trade in all of its colonies by 1840.26 Denmark prohibited the
slave trade as of 1802. Sweden abolished the trade in 1813, as did the
Netherlands in 1814. The 1814 Treaty of Ghent between the United States
and Great Britain pledged both nations to "use their best endeavors" to
eliminate the entire trade. 27 The eight European states represented at the
1815 Congress of Vienna resolving the Napoleonic Wars denounced the
22. Judith Resnick, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federal-
ism s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1587 (2006) (noting that "both abolitionists and
slaveholders looked overseas for endorsement of their positions"). See generally BETTY FLADELAND,
MEN AND BROTHERS 110 & n. 17 (1972) (discussing cross-border dialogue in antislavery efforts).
23. See 1 JOHN CODMAN HURD, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
342 (1858).
24. DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY 388 n.102 (2001).
25. Mark Janis, Dred Scott and International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 763, 771 (2005).
26. Id. at 769,771.
27. FLADELAND, supra note 22, at 110 & n.17 (internal quotations omitted).
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slave trade as disgraceful and degrading. 28 The Congresses of London and
Aix-la-Chapelle also condemned the trade.29
By 1850, Great Britain had entered treaties with thirty-one nations to
suppress the trade,30 including treaties with Portugal and Spain (1817),3 1
Holland (1818),32 Sweden (1824), and Brazil (1827).33 Brazil pronounced
the trade illegal in 1830. 34 During the late 1830s and early 1840s, Britain
entered agreements on suppression of the trade with Latin American coun-
tries, including Chile, the Argentine Confederation, Uruguay, Bolivia,
Venezuela, Texas, Equator (now Ecuador), and Mexico. 35 Multilateral
treaties aimed at suppressing the trade were entered among Britain, France,
Denmark, Sardinia, Naples, Tuscany, the Hansa towns, Russia, Austria,
and Prussia between 1830 and 1840.36 Thus, by 1857 American slavery
itself was a "peculiar institution"-an increasingly exceptional practice
within the international community.
International publicists reflected these evolving attitudes toward the
validity of slavery. Publicists took different positions on the legality of
slavery under international law in the eighteenth and early nineteenth cen-
turies, as well as different positions regarding the effect of the perceived
international law rule on domestic law. Thus, Vattel's 1758 treatise The
Law of Nations condemned the practice of holding enemy prisoners cap-
tured in wartime as slaves, even though international law writers since the
Romans had recognized the practice.37 In the 1820s, Chancellor Kent's
Commentaries on American Law invoked Montesquieu's admonition that
slavery was "useless and unjust. '38 Kent found that the slave trade was
"illegal, when declared so by treaty, or municipal law," but he concluded
that it was not yet "piratical or illegal by the common law of nations,"
28. Id. at 112-13.
29. Id. at 113,115.
30. 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 420-21 (3d ed. 1879)
(cataloguing treaties).
31. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 24, at 388 n.102. The treaty with Spain abolished the Spanish
trade above the equator immediately and below the equator by 1820. Portugal retained the right to trade
in slaves south of the equator and did not completely abolish that aspect of the trade until 1836. Id.
32. FLADELAND, supra note 22, at 115.
33. Leslie Bethell, The Mixed Commissions for the Suppression of the Transatlantic Slave Trade
in the Nineteenth Century, 7 J. AFR. HIST. 79, 80 n.4, 82 (1966).
34. Id. at 91.
35. Id. at 83.
36. Janis, supra note 25, at 771. See generally HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF
THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE: 1440-1870, at 561-785 (1997).
37. Janis, supra note 25, at 766-67.
38. Id. at 771, 773 (internal quotations omitted).
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given the extent of recent state practice. 39 Henry Wheaton's treatise Ele-
ments of International Law, first published in 1836, was also sharply criti-
cal of slavery and the slave trade. 40
Transnational judicial dialogue also was common to nineteenth-
century slavery jurisprudence. Judges in the United States were familiar
with decisions addressing similar problems from other national jurisdic-
tions and invoked foreign authorities to the extent that they found them
appropriate. This was particularly true for cases that involved the move-
ment of slaves between jurisdictions that recognized and prohibited slav-
ery. The problem presented in Dred Scott of the relocation of a slave from a
jurisdiction that protected slavery (Missouri) to jurisdictions that prohibited
it (the State of Illinois and the Minnesota Territory) was replicated overseas
in the movement of slaves between slaveholding colonies and the non-
slaveholding metropolis, and the passage of slaves and their masters into
national jurisdictions that prohibited slavery, such as France. The move-
ment of slaves accordingly injected principles of comity among foreign
nations, private international choice-of-law principles, and international
rules regarding the territorial jurisdiction of sovereign states into antebel-
lum debates over slavery. At the international level, these principles gov-
erned the question of whether one nation should respect the status of slave
or free bestowed by another nation (or colony). In controversies between
jurisdictions within the United States, the same principles were applied.
Jurists commonly assumed that the several states were equivalent to inter-
national sovereigns for purposes of applying international principles of
territorial jurisdiction and choice of law. 41
Impulses of American exceptionalism also emerged in political de-
bates over slavery. Proslavery forces combined with anti-British and anti-
European sentiments to lead the United States to be a reluctant participant
in transnational efforts to abolish the slave trade. Efforts to include the
United States in cooperative search arrangements with other nations fell
victim to concerns about British aspirations to abolish slavery in toto, a
desire to protect the freedom of U.S. ships on the high seas, and raw parti-
39. Id. at 773 (internal quotations omitted); see also Paul Finkelman, The Centrality of Slavery in
American Legal Development, in SLAVERY AND THE LAW 4 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997) (contending
that slavery "was not considered illegal under nineteenth-century notions of international law").
40. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1836); see also Janis, supra note
25, at 777-78.
41. See discussion infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text. See generally Paul Finkelman,
Race and Domestic International Law in the United States, 17 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 25 (2003) (discussing
application of international choice of law rules in domestic interstate slavery conflicts).
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san politics.42 Senator Troup of Georgia opposed "entanglement" with
foreign nations in this area on explicitly exceptionalist grounds.43 The
United States ultimately entered a treaty with Great Britain in 1842 to co-
operate in intercepting slaving vessels off the coast of Africa, but it did not
accept foreign search or bilateral adjudication of American vessels until
1862.44
A. European Approaches to Slavery Conflicts
1. Slavery and the English Common Law
Two decisions from the British courts played a critical role in influ-
encing U.S. decisions regarding both the legality of slavery under interna-
tional law and the appropriate choice-of-law rules in cases that involved the
interjurisdictional movement of slaves. In the Somerset case, Lord Mans-
field famously declared for the King's Bench that slavery was "so odious,
that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law."'45 Slavery, in
other words, was not protected by international law, but only by the posi-
tive law of the jurisdiction in which the slave was found. James Somerset
was a slave in Virginia who had been brought by his master to England,
and later was forcibly returned to a ship to be sent to Jamaica and sold.
While the boat was docked in the Thames River, Somerset challenged his
confinement by writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the owner could not
assert his rights to a slave on English soil.46 Lord Mansfield framed the
question as "whether any dominion, authority or coercion can be exercised
in this country, on a slave according to the American laws? '47 Mansfield
recognized that "[t]he power of a master over his slave has been extremely
different, in different countries. '48 English law did not explicitly prohibit
slavery, but Mansfield nevertheless concluded, "I cannot say this case is
42. In 1818, with fresh scars from the War of 1812, the United States refused to join a British
proposal to cooperate in the search and seizure of slave vessels and for the establishment of bilateral
mixed commissions to adjudicate claims involving captured vessels. See FLADELAND, supra note 22, at
113, 115-20. The Senate also fatally amended a proposed 1824 anti-slave trade convention with Great
Britain. Id. at 125-44; see also Resnick supra note 22, at 1586 n.82. See generally FEHRENBACHER,
supra note 24, at 158-60.
43. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 100 (1818) (remarks of Mr. Troup) ("You are admonished against
entangling alliances; for what reason? Because our Government is of its own kind, insulated, the only
Republic in the world, between which and other Governments there is no common principle, no com-
mon feeling, no common sympathy .... ).
44. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 24, at 169; Resnick, supra note 22, at 1586-87.
45. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510 (K.B. 1772).
46. Id. at 499.
47. Id. at 509.
48. Id. at 510.
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allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must
be discharged. '49 The decision itself did not outlaw slavery in England, but
it established that English law would not protect enslaved status on English
soil, and that the writ of habeas corpus was available to discharge any per-
son held as a slave there.50 Interestingly, the arguments and the decision
did not address the length of Somerset's stay in England or whether Somer-
set had changed domicile in England and therefore had changed his status
from slave to free. The decision held instead that the status of slavery was
not recognized and would not be enforced in England.
In the 1827 decision in The Slave, Grace,51 Lord Stowell (Sir William
Scott) sought to clarify and restrict the Somerset holding. Grace was a slave
who had been brought by her mistress from Antigua to live in England for
a year. Grace had returned to Antigua with her mistress and later was
seized by a customs official who assumed, under the principles of Somer-
set, that her time in England had rendered her free. Writing for the High
Court of Admiralty (and thus lacking legal authority to modify the holding
of the King's Bench in Somerset), Lord Stowell nevertheless ruled that the
return to Antigua had resurrected Grace's enslaved status. In contrast to
Mansfield's assertion that slavery was odious and derived only from posi-
tive law, Stowell held that slavery, like the common law, legitimately
originated from "ancient custom," which was "generally recognised as a
just foundation of all law .... -52 The invalidity of slavery in England itself
was only a matter of positive law and turned on the "peculiar nature" of the
English context. 53 Slavery could exist in the colonies, and residence in
England did not permanently manumit slaves, but only suspended their
condition. It "put their liberty ... into a sort of parenthesis." 54 Their status
as slaves could therefore revive, or reattach, upon their return to the slave-
holding jurisdiction. It is no small irony that the effort to retrench slavery in
Grace came roughly five years before Great Britain abolished slavery
throughout its colonies.
Somerset and Grace grappled with three questions of importance to
later slavery cases. First, what was the status of slavery under international
law? Was slavery protected by international law? Was it prohibited? In
either event, how did international law interface with municipal laws on the
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-
American World, 42 U. C-i. L. REV. 86, 107-08 (1974).
51. Rex v. Allan (The Slave, Grace), 2 Hagg. 94, 166 Eng. Rep. 179 (Adm. 1827).
52. Id. at 107, 166 Eng. Rep. at 183.
53. Id. at 109, 166 Eng. Rep. at 184.
54. Id. at 131, 166 Eng. Rep. at 192.
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subject? Lord Mansfield's answer to the first part of this question was no.
Slavery was "odious" as a matter of natural law and was not protected by
international law. It therefore could only be established by positive munici-
pal law. Mansfield did not go so far, however, as to say that international
law prohibited slavery even where it was recognized by positive law. Lord
Stowell's answer was less clear. He suggested that international law, de-
rived from longstanding custom, recognized slavery. He also suggested that
international custom might be sufficient to establish slavery where positive
domestic law did not explicitly prohibit it.
Second, a choice-of-law question-did international principles of
comity obligate a free jurisdiction to recognize the enslaved status of a
foreign slave brought into the jurisdiction, out of deference to the laws of
the foreign jurisdiction? Mansfield's answer again was no. Slavery required
a complex and comprehensive municipal legal regime to enforce it, and
that regime did not exist in England. Thus, England was not obligated to
recognize the slave laws of the foreign forum.
The Slave, Grace posed the opposite choice-of-law question-assuming
that a slave was rendered free by presence in a non-slave jurisdiction, did
that free status prevail if the person returned to a slaveholding jurisdiction?
Was the status of liberty, in other words, sufficiently powerful to be nonre-
scindable? Lord Stowell's answer to this question was no.
One possible reading of Somerset and Grace together was that the
positive law of the local jurisdiction controlled, whether slave or free. But
the differing approach in the two cases also could be reconciled based on
the slave's length of stay in England-based on an implicit finding that
Somerset's longer stay in England had changed his domicile, while Grace's
shorter stay had not. Under this approach, enslaved status could reattach
only if the slave had not acquired a new domicile-and full freedom-in
the free jurisdiction.
Somerset was decided in 1772 and formed part of the corpus of the
English common law that was operative in the colonies at the time of the
American Revolution. To the extent that the opinion stood for the proposi-
tion that English law did not allow slavery, it raised difficult questions
regarding how slavery could be valid in the British colonies if it was inva-
lid under the law of England. 55 The operation of the English common law
in the colonies was not perfect, however, and the direct legal force of the
decision in the American colonies therefore was unclear. Even in the colo-
nial era, the various colonies incorporated the English common law only as
55. Wiecek, supra note 50, at 112.
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"applicable to their situation. '56 As the South Carolina Supreme Court
observed in 1796,
In the act of the legislature ... extending that [English common law]
system to Carolina, then a province to Great Britain, there is a proviso
or exception as to all those parts of [the common law], which were in-
consistent with the particular constitutions, CUSTOMS and LAWS of this
(then) province, which left an opening for this ... custom of tolerating
slavery, and every thing relative to the government of slaves in Caro-
lina.57
Following the Revolution, the various states individually determined what
aspects of the English common law they would receive into their domestic
systems, 58 thus further qualifying any direct applicability of the Somerset
decision.
By the 1800s, in other words, Somerset could have been rejected as ir-
relevant by the American slaveholding states. This is particularly true since
Somerset could have been distinguished from the American situation both
because the case did not involve the presence of a slave in a jurisdiction
that explicitly prohibited slavery through positive law (as the Northern
states and territories did) and because the case involved the legal relation-
ship between Great Britain and her subordinate colonies, rather than comity
between equal sovereigns. Alternatively, the decision could have been
viewed as purely advisory or persuasive-as evidence from a legal system
that shared certain common values with American jurisprudence.
The decision in The Slave, Grace brought no similar legal ambiguity.
Decided in the 1820s, Grace came well after the Revolution and thus was
part of the common law of the American states only to the extent that the
decision was affirmatively embraced by those states. The legal status of the
two decisions, however, whether as part of American common law or as
purely persuasive foreign authority, appears to have made little difference
to American jurists. Both decisions were given extensive and substantial
consideration in the American jurisprudence of slavery, including in the
Dred Scott case.
56. Id. at 122 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Lord Mansfield); see also Livingston v.
Jefferson, IS F. Cas. 660, 665 (C.C.D. Va. 1811) (No. 8,411) (Marshall, J.) ("When our ancestors
migrated to America, they brought with them the common law of their native country, so far as it was
applicable to their new situation ....").
57. White v. Chambers, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 70, 74 (1796).
58. For a discussion of the reception of English law by the colonies and American states, see
ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW, 1776-1836, at 21-45 (1964);
Ford W. Hall, The Common Law: An Account of Its Reception in the United States, 4 VAND. L. REV.
791, 796 (1951) (noting the "incomplete acceptance" of English common law); see also Seminole Tribe
of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 130-42 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (discussing early American
limitations on reception of the common law).
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The status of slavery under the English common law also inspired ar-
guments based on American exceptionalism. American advocates and ju-
rists on both sides of the slavery question at times sought to distance U.S.
law from the common law heritage. William Cushing, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, accordingly charged the jury in
Commonwealth v. Jennison that English legal principles that supported
slavery were inapplicable in the United States. "[W]hatever usages for-
merly ... slid in upon us by the examples of others," he urged, "they can
no longer exist. Sentiments more favorable to the natural rights of man-
kind... have prevailed since the [Revolution]." 59
2. Huber and the Civil Law Tradition
The English common law approach in Somerset and Grace coexisted
with a distinct international choice of law principle, articulated by the sev-
enteenth-century Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber (also known by his Latinized
name Huberus), who was the leading authority on international choice-of-
law principles of the era. Huber's work on conflicts was heavily relied
upon by Justice Story in his Commentaries, and Huber's ten-page essay on
choice-of-law principles was appended in full to a 1797 U.S. Supreme
Court decision. 60 Huber asserted three principles as established by "the law
of nations":
I st. The laws of every [country] have force within the limits of that gov-
ernment, and are obligatory upon all who are within its bounds;
2nd. All persons within the limits of a government are considered as sub-
jects; ....
3rd. By the courtesy of nations, whatever laws are carried into execution,
within the limits of any government, are considered as having the same
effect every where, so far as they do not.., prejudice.., the rights of
the other governments, or their citizens.61
Huber further reasoned that "[p]ersonal rights or disabilities obtained,
or communicated, by the laws of any particular place, are of a nature which
accompany, the person wherever he goes .... -"62 As such, a person's status
was entitled to respect under his third principle.
59. John D. Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in Massachusetts: More
Notes on the "Quock Walker Case," 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 133 (1961).
60. Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 369, 370 n.* (1797); see also JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 29, at 28 (1865). For further discussion, see Ulricus
Huber, De Conflictu Legum, reprinted in D.J. Llewelyn Davies, The Influence of Huber's De Conflictu
Legum on English Private International Law, 18 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1937); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET
AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 2.5, 2.7 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing the influence of Huber).
61. Emory, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 370 n.*.
62. Id. at 375 n.*.
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Huber's thinking on personal status drew upon vestigial Roman law
concepts of the right of transit and the recognition of status that continued
to inform international law. 63 Under Roman law, a person's status was
determined by the law of his domicile. That status traveled with him and
was to be respected by foreign jurisdictions, unless and until he changed his
domicile. Under this approach, the status of a slave would change only if
the master moved to free territory with the intent to change domicile. If the
requisite intent were present, however, the slave was freed, no matter how
brief the stay.64 Moreover, the new status fixed permanently, and the slave
status would not reattach upon return to the prior domicile. 65
Antislavery advocates accordingly understood this "rule of Huberus"
to provide that personal liberty acquired in one forum could not be divested
by the laws of a subsequent jurisdiction. This principle was in apparent
tension with the holding in The Slave, Grace that slave status could be res-
urrected.66 Abolitionists, however, distinguished Grace on the grounds that
the case had not involved a change in domicile and that no positive English
law explicitly prohibited slavery, in contrast to the law of northern U.S.
states and territories.
B. The International Law of Slavery in American Courts
International and foreign authorities were commonly invoked in early
U.S. cases, 67 and slavery cases were no exception. Early American judicial
decisions addressing slavery drew widely from aspects of international and
63. Note, American Slavery and the Conflict ofLaws, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 74, 89 (1971).
64. See, e.g., Bush's Representatives v. White, 19 Ky. (3 T.B. Mon.) 75 (1825); Winny v. White-
sides, I Mo. 472 (1824) (finding an intent to change residence).
65. Note, supra note 63, at 90; see also S. LIVERMORE, DISSERTATIONS ON THE QUESTIONS
WHICH ARISE FROM THE CONTRARIETY OF THE POSITIVE LAWS OF DIFFERENT STATES AND NATIONS
28 (1828) (observing that states "cannot pretend to legislate upon the state and condition, the capacity
or incapacity, of persons not subject to them. They may refuse to admit such persons to enter their
territory; but if they do receive them, they are bound to receive them with that character, which has
been imprinted on them, by the laws of the country, to which they are subject."). See generally THOMAS
R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY 1N THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 116-
37(1858).
66. Although popular in the U.S., Huber and the Netherlands school of conflicts law were not
popular in England, which may account for the differing outcome in The Slave, Grace. Or the Grace
decision may have implicitly found that no change of domicile had occurred in England.
67. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832); Brown v. United States, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 122-25, 128 (1814); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 442-49 (1793)
(Iredell, J.). See generally Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 16 (discussing the use of international and
foreign authority in constitutional and non-constitutional cases); Cleveland, supra note 14 (discussing
historical use of international law in constitutional cases); Vicki C. Jackson, Transnational Discourse,
Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 271 (2003) (discuss-
ing the use of comparative law prior to 1850).
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foreign law. 68 In the 1822 case of United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, Jus-
tice Story, sitting as Circuit Justice in Massachusetts, held that slavery vio-
lated the contemporary law of nations. The case involved an allegedly
French vessel that had been seized as a prize off the coast of Africa for
engaging in the slave trade. Both France and the United States had prohib-
ited the slave trade, but the U.S. prohibition could not be enforced against a
foreign vessel. The case therefore raised the question whether U.S. nation-
als could lawfully seize the foreign vessel for violating "the general law of
nations."'69 Justice Story identified three sources for the law of nations: (1)
natural law or "general principles of right and justice"; (2) customary prac-
tices of civilized nations; and (3) positive law, in the form of treaties and
municipal laws. 70 Natural law included principles "that may be fairly de-
duced by correct reasoning from the rights and duties of nations, and the
nature of moral obligation," and could be enforced by American courts
unless it was "relaxed or waived by the consent of nations .... ,,71
Justice Story found that all three sources of international law estab-
lished slavery's invalidity. From the perspective of natural law, slavery was
"repugnant to the general principles of justice and humanity. '72 This senti-
ment was also confirmed by the other two sources-custom and positive
law. Slavery was allowed by the municipal laws of some nations (and of
the slaveholding U.S. states), and many nations continued to engage in the
slave trade.73 Nevertheless, citing recent developments in the U.S. and
Europe, Story observed that nearly every maritime nation of Europe had
condemned the slave trade as unjust through treaties and other solemn acts,
and the traffic was "vindicated by no nation, and is admitted by almost all
commercial nations as incurably unjust and inhuman. '74 Story emphasized
that the law of nations was continually evolving and that the establishment
of an international rule required only consistent widespread practice among
states, not universal acceptance. 75 He thus found that the slave trade was
"reprehended by the present sense of nations" 76 and "prohibited by univer-
68. For further discussion of the role of international law regarding slavery and the slave trade in
the years leading up to Dred Scott, see generally Janis, supra note 25, at 764-81, and William M.
Wiecek, Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme Court, 1820-1860, 65 J. AM. HIST. 34
(1978).
69. 26 F. Cas. 832, 840 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551).
70. Id. at 846.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 845.
74. Id. at 847.
75. See id. at 846.
76. Id. at 845.
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sal law."' 77 Foreign-flagged vessels engaged in the slave trade accordingly
could be seized as prize unless the trade was affirmatively protected by the
ship's own flag state. The slave trade was prohibited by international law
and universally enforceable unless the positive law of the flag state allowed
it.
Justice Story's view that the slave trade was prohibited by both natural
law and the law of nations was revisited, and significantly qualified, by the
Supreme Court three years later in The Antelope.78 That case involved an
American vessel illegally engaging in the slave trade that had pirated slaves
from Portuguese and Spanish vessels. The ship's slave cargo ultimately
was seized by U.S. authorities while it was under the command of U.S.
citizens. One-third of the slaves had died during the journey. The resulting
condemnation proceeding presented the question whether the remaining
slaves should be freed under U.S. law (since the pirating American ship
was engaging in the trade illegally), or whether the slaves should be re-
turned to their prior Spanish and Portuguese owners (who apparently had
been lawfully engaging in the trade under their national laws).
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that slavery
originated in force 79 and was "contrary to the law of nature."' 80 Unlike Jus-
tice Story, however, Marshall concluded that it was not prohibited by the
positive law of nations. Marshall distanced himself from Story's view that
natural law could inform international law. International law derived, he
wrote, not from morality, but solely from "the usages, the national acts, and
the general assent" of nations (Justice Story's second and third sources). 81
With respect to positive law, where Story had found a recent evolving
international norm prohibiting the trade, Marshall took a longer view of the
relevant state practice and gave less weight to recent developments. Na-
tions of antiquity had once recognized the right to enslave wartime cap-
tives, and although the United States and Britain recently had worked
aggressively to eliminate the slave trade, all the civilized nations of the
world had engaged in the practice for many years.82 The Chief Justice con-
cluded that "[t]hat trade could not be considered as contrary to the law of
nations which was authorized and protected by the laws of all commercial
nations .... "83
77. Id. at 851.
78. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825).
79. Id. at 121.
80. Id. at 120.
81. Id. at 121.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 115.
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Marshall bolstered his conclusion that the slave trade was allowable
under international law with an international choice-of-law principle-that
"[t]he Courts of no country execute the penal laws of another .... -"84 The
fact that slavery might be illegal in one country did not obligate other coun-
tries to invalidate the practice, nor did it authorize one state to enforce its
penal laws on another. Accordingly, the slave trade remained lawful to
citizens of nations that had not forbidden it,85 and "the legality of the cap-
ture of a vessel engaged in the slave trade, depends on the law of the coun-
try to which the vessel belongs. ' 86 Marshall ruled that surviving slaves
would be returned to the Spanish owner in proportion to the number that
had been originally seized from the Spanish ship. The remaining slaves,
because their ownership was indeterminate, were turned over to U.S. au-
thorities to be freed. 87
Marshall thus articulated a choice-of-law principle analogous to that in
The Slave, Grace-that local law determined the validity of slavery. Mar-
shall nevertheless had conceded that slavery was contrary to natural law,
and required positive law in the forum-in the form of municipal law or
clearly established international law-to sustain it. The principle that slav-
ery was contrary to natural law also permeated state court opinions regard-
ing slavery, 88 and would prove important to the debate over whether due
process limited Congress's power to regulate slavery.89
La Jeune Eugenie and The Antelope both involved prize courts apply-
ing the law of nations to vessels captured in the slave trade. But interna-
tional authorities also informed some constitutional slavery cases. In
invalidating Pennsylvania's law forbidding the return of fugitive slaves in
Prigg v. Pennsylvania,90 for example, Justice Story held that the Constitu-
tion's Fugitive Slave Clause had been explicitly intended to supersede in-
ternational choice-of-law rules. "By the general law of nations," Story
84. Id. at 123.
85. Id. at 122.
86. Id. at 118; see also Commonwealth v. Ayes, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836) (applying Somer-
set to hold that a slave temporarily residing in Massachusetts was free, but recognizing that slavery was
not prohibited by the law of nations in countries that had not prohibited it through treaty or domestic
law).
87. The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 132-33.
88. In Rankin v. Lydia, for example, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Kentucky described slavery
"as a right existing by positive law of a municipal character, without foundation in the law of nature or
the unwritten and common law." 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 470 (1820), quoted in Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 624 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
89. See discussion infra Part II.D.
90. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). In his concurrence in Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449,
512 (1841), Justice Baldwin looked to U.S. treaties from the Founding era to demonstrate that slaves
were viewed as property subject to the Commerce Clause.
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wrote, "no nation is bound to recognise the state of slavery, as to foreign
slaves found within its territorial dominions .... This was fully recognised
in Somerset's Case, which was decided before the American revolution." 91
To Justice Story, slavery, instead, was "a mere municipal regulation,
founded upon and limited to the range of the [state's] territorial laws."'92
Story observed that before the Constitution was adopted, the right to re-
claim a slave from another state was recognized only "as a matter of comity
and favour, and not as a matter of... international obligation .... -"93 He
concluded that "[i]t is manifest from this consideration, that if the Constitu-
tion had not contained this [Fugitive Slave] clause, every non-slave-holding
state in the Union would have been at liberty to have declared free all run-
away slaves coming within its limits .... ,,94 Story therefore asserted an
argument of American exceptionalism: the Constitution set the United
States apart from international rules on this issue. International law other-
wise would have allowed Pennsylvania to prohibit slavery and the return of
fugitive slaves. English cases, for example, had held that a slave escaping
to free or neutral territory became free. 95
Somerset and Grace also figured into the arguments before the Court
in Strader v. Graham,96 the immediate predecessor to Dred Scott. Graham
was a Kentucky slave owner who sued Strader for allegedly helping Gra-
ham's slaves escape to Canada. Strader asserted, as a defense, the claim
that the slaves had already been freed as a result of brief periods they had
spent on free soil in Ohio and Indiana with their owner's consent, before
they returned to Kentucky. Counsel for Strader argued that the Northwest
Ordinance's antislavery provision had been adopted after the rule in Som-
erset and established a similar principle Indiana and Ohio stood "as to the
subject of slavery like England," and under Somerset, the slaves were
free.97 He rejected the reasoning in Grace as "a monstrosity." 98 Counsel for
the slaveholder, on the other hand, cited The Slave, Grace for the proposi-
91. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 611-12 (citations omitted).
92. Id. at 611.
93. Id. at 623.
94. Id. at 612. In Jones v. Vanzandt, Justice McLean, sitting as circuit justice, similarly observed
that "no general principle in the law of nations ... would require a surrender" of a fugitive slave, and
that the rule that a slave who entered a jurisdiction where slavery was not tolerated became free "would
be the law of these states, had the constitution of the United States adopted no regulation upon the
subject." 13 F. Cas. 1040, 1042 (C.C.D. Ohio 1843) (No. 7,501).
95. E.g., Forbes v. Cochrane, 107 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1824).
96. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851).
97. Id. at 85-86 (argument for plaintiffs in error).
98. Id. at 92.
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tion that, regardless whether the slaves gained freedom in Ohio, their slave
status reattached upon their return to Kentucky.99
The choice-of-law question that would be confronted in Dred Scott
thus was almost squarely presented. The Supreme Court, however, dis-
missed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Chief Justice Taney's opinion for
the Court nevertheless addressed the merits in dicta. The Chief Justice did
not explicitly mention the English authorities, but he nevertheless asserted
that every state had the authority to determine the status of persons within
its jurisdiction. Thus "[i]t was exclusively in the power of Kentucky to
determine for itself whether their employment in another State should or
should not make them free on their return." Taney went on to assert that a
federal law "could have no more operation" in Kentucky than the laws of
another state. 100 If credited, the Chief Justice's dicta foreclosed the argu-
ment in Dred Scott that the Missouri Compromise, as a federal law explic-
itly prohibiting slavery, was entitled to greater deference by states than
another state's laws. Justice McLean condemned the discussion as "extra-
judicial" dicta, 101 but the Chief Justice had clearly shown his hand on the
choice-of-law question that Dred Scott would bring to the Court.
The use of international authority was not unique to the adjudication
of slavery questions. The antebellum slave cases simply formed part of a
broader, ongoing dialogue in the nineteenth-century courts over the extent
to which the U.S. national government and the state governments possessed
the powers of international sovereigns. Were principles deduced from in-
ternational law regarding the rights of sovereign states relevant to deter-
mining the powers of the national government? To determining the powers
of the state governments? Likewise, could relations between the several
states be analogized to interstate relations under international law? Or was
the United States' peculiar divided sovereignty so exceptional as to render
prevailing international rules irrelevant?
Construing the constitutional powers of the national and state govern-
ments and their relations with each other thus presented a nineteenth-
century version of the debate over American exceptionalism. Did the Con-
stitution's "horizontal" federalism provisions governing relations between
the states replicate or alter existing international law principles governing
relations between independent nations? In addition to Justice Story's analy-
sis of the Fugitive Slave Clause, discussed above, this debate was visible in
99. Id. at 90 (citing Rex v. Allan (The Slave, Grace), 2 Hagg. 94, 166 Eng. Rep. 179 (Adm. 1827))
(argument for defendant); see also id. at 92 (argument for plaintiffs in error).
100. ld. at 94.
101. Id. at 97 (McLean, J., concurring).
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cases construing the Compact Clause, 102 interstate and international extra-
dition, 10 3 and Supreme Court original jurisdiction over disputes between
states. 104 To pre-Civil War jurists, the states were commonly understood as
equivalent to international sovereigns except to the extent that their powers
were constitutionally limited by the federal system and the national gov-
ernment. Questions regarding which state's law determined the status of a
slave were also analogous to conflicts-of-law questions confronted under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause 105 and later under the Fourteenth Amend-
102. U.S. CONST, art. 1, § 10, cl. 3. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 573 (1840)
(construing the Compact Clause in light of international law); Poole v. Fleeger's Lessee, 36 U.S. (II
Pet.) 185, 209 (1837) (holding that the Compact Clause preserved for the states, with the consent of
Congress, the international law authority of sovereigns to resolve boundary disputes).
103. In Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, Chief Justice Taney interpreted the Constitu-
tion's Treaty and Compact Clauses in light of foreign practice and the writings of Vattel and other
publicists to conclude that international extradition was an exclusive federal power. The Court later
rejected the applicability of international rules to interstate extradition. See Lascelles v. Georgia, 148
U.S. 537 (1893) (holding that an international rule that a person extradited to stand trial for one offense
could not be tried for another offense did not apply to interstate extradition); Kentucky v Dennison, 65
U.S. (24 How.) 66, 99-100 (1861) (holding that the Article IV, Section 2 Extradition Clause did not
incorporate the exception for political crimes recognized in international extradition).
104. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 143 (1902) (defining the Court's original jurisdic-
tion as extending to disputes between states which, "prior to the Union, would have been just cause for
reprisal by the complaining State" under international law); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S.
265, 289 (1888) (holding that the Constitution "was not intended to confer... jurisdiction of a
suit... [that] could not, on the settled principles of public and international law, be entertained by the
judiciary of the other State at all").
105. James Wilson argued at the Constitutional Convention that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was designed to require "more than what now takes place among all Independent Nations." 2 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). The Su-
preme Court nevertheless looked to private international rules regarding conflicts of law throughout the
nineteenth century. See Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 582 (1906) (holding that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause incorporates the "principle[] of international law [that a marriage] was entitled to obliga-
tory extraterritorial effect .... (citing I FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
441, § 209 (3d ed. 1905))); Grover & Baker Sewing Mach Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287, 296 (1890)
(finding that matters of state jurisdiction under the Clause were "international" rather than "municipal"
questions, and that the principle that states did not enjoy extraterritorial jurisdiction was "the familiar,
reasonable and just principle of the law of nations" (quoting STORY, supra note 60, at 451 (1865)
(internal quotations omitted))); Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 462-63 (1874) (finding
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause preserved the power [under international law] to inquire into the
jurisdiction of the sister court); D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165, 174 (1851) (construing the
Full Faith and Credit Clause based on the "well-established rules of international law" that foreign
states disregard a judgment where the person has not been served with process); McElmoyle v. Cohen,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312, 327 (1839) (holding that through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, "[tihe Consti-
tution did not mean to confer a new power of jurisdiction, but simply to regulate the effect of the ac-
knowledged jurisdiction over persons and things within the state" (quoting STORY, supra note 60, at
183 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted))). For the contrary view that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause abolished international law rules, see Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935)
("[T]he constitutional limitation imposed by the full faith and credit clause abolished, in large measure,
the general principle of international law by which local policy is permitted to dominate rules of com-
ity."); Milwaukee County. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935) (asserting that "[tihe very
purpose of the full-faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under the laws.., of the others, and to
make them integral parts of a single nation throughout which" enforcement of an obligation "might be
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ment Due Process Clause, 106 and international law was employed in both
contexts. 107
A separate question was brewing in the courts and Congress regarding
the nature of Congress's powers of governance in the territories. As dis-
cussed below, the Dred Scott decision temporarily answered (in the nega-
tive) the question whether Congress possessed the plenary powers to
govern territories that were enjoyed by other nations under international
law.108
In short, given the comfort of the nineteenth-century courts with for-
eign and international legal authorities as interpretative references, it is
unsurprising that foreign sources featured prominently in the arguments of
the members of the Dred Scott Court.
C. Foreign Authority in the Courts of Missouri
From the above, it is apparent that at the time Dred Scott came to the
Supreme Court, a number of foreign and international law principles had
developed that proved relevant to Scott's claim for freedom. With respect
to the substantive legality of slavery, slavery was acknowledged as a viola-
tion of natural law and as entirely a creation of positive law. Courts, how-
ever, had disagreed whether even the slave trade was prohibited by
international law. Chief Justice Marshall had suggested in The Antelope
that international law recognized the trade, and that the positive law vali-
dating slavery could include international law.
With respect to the question of what jurisdiction's law controlled,
Somerset and choice-of-law principles recognized that no nation would
demanded as of right"); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 180-82 (1895) (noting that the Full Faith and
Credit Clause was adopted to ensure uniform enforcement of judgments among the several states, in
contrast to international practice, where a foreign judgment generally was only prima facie evidence of
the claim); Mills v. Duryee, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813) (holding that both the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and the implementing statute required full recognition of sister state judgments).
106. Cf Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (holding that the ability of state courts to
exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants is based on "two well-established principles of public
law": "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory," and that "no State can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or
property without its territory" (citing STORY, supra note 60; WHEATON, supra note 40)).
107. Indeed, in Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892), Justice Gray invoked The Antelope to
hold that the Full Faith and Credit Clause incorporated "the fundamental maxim of international
law... [that] '[t]he courts of no country execute the penal laws of another."' Id. at 666 (quoting The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825)); see also id. at 670 (describing "the international rule
which forbids such laws to be enforced in any other country"); id. at 669 (quoting Blackstone's report
of Chief Justice DeGrey's statement of the general rule of international comity that "[c]rimes are in
their nature local and the jurisdiction of crimes is local").
108. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511, 542-43 (1828) (examining the source of
Congress's powers in the territories); see also discussion infra Part II.C.
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enforce the penal laws of another and that a free jurisdiction could decline
to respect slavery imposed by a foreign jurisdiction. The Slave, Grace rec-
ognized the possibility that slave status could reattach upon return to a
slaveholding jurisdiction. Huber and the continental civil law tradition, on
the other hand, contended that a slave who established a new domicile in a
free jurisdiction was manumitted and forever free.
Southern state courts in the antebellum period generally followed
Somerset and Huber to recognize freedom for a slave who became domi-
ciled in a free jurisdiction and then returned to a slave holding state. The
"rule of Huberus" also prevailed in Missouri state jurisprudence (and in
other states) prior to the state court decision in Dred Scott's case. In Winny
v. Whitesides,10 9 the first Missouri Supreme Court decision addressing the
status of a slave who had entered free territory and had then returned to
Missouri, the court cited Huber for the international law principle that a
slave carried to reside in the Illinois territory was thereby emancipated. The
court indicated that respecting such freedom was particularly important in
the federal system. As the court put it,
Huberus, quoted 3 Dallas, 375, says, personal rights or disabilities, ob-
tained or communicated by the laws of any particular place, are of a na-
ture, which accompany the person wherever he goes. If this be the case,
in countries altogether independent of each other, how much more in the
case of a person removing from [federal territory], to one of those
States .... We are clearly of the opinion, that, if by a residence in Illi-
nois, the plaintiff in error lost her right to the property in the defendant,
that right was not revived by a removal of the parties to Missouri.1 10
The court relied upon English precedent for the proposition that free-
dom was the necessary result of a slave residing in a territory where slavery
was prohibited." '1 The court reasoned that if this principle applied in Eng-
land, where no positive municipal law explicitly prohibited slavery, it
surely was applicable when a slave entered a state or U.S. territory where
slavery was expressly forbidden by the Northwest Ordinance.
The defendant had argued that the status of slavery "revived" upon
Winny's return to Missouri, but the court flatly rejected this proposition.
Winny was decided before The Slave, Grace, but the Missouri court contin-
ued to reaffirm this approach in later cases. 112
109. 1Mo. 472.
110. Id.at475.
11l. Id. at 475-76 ("The common law judges of England, without any positive declaration of the
will of the legislative body, availed themselves of every indirect admission of the master or lord, in
favor of the liberty of his slave ... and the lord ... was never after permitted to claim the benefit of his
services as a slave.").
112. See, e.g., Rachael v. Walker, 4 Mo. 350, 352-54 (1836).
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By Scott v. Emerson, however, the political winds had changed in
Missouri, and the state supreme court reversed Winny to deny Scott free-
dom. The decision reflected hardening attitudes toward slavery in both
Northern and Southern states, and a corresponding reluctance of courts to
continue to respect the laws regarding slavery of the other. Northern states
became increasingly willing to recognize freedom when a slave simply
entered the jurisdiction, thus abandoning the requirements of a lengthy stay
or domicile. Slave states like Missouri, by contrast, were less willing to
respect freedom bestowed by a Northern state after the former slave re-
turned home. These developments facilitated the parallel evolution of in-
ternational choice of law rules which increasingly advocated primacy of the
law of the home forum.
International rules and foreign precedent again played a role in the
state court decision. Counsel for Scott's master, Emerson, argued that Mis-
souri should follow the international principle that one jurisdiction was not
obligated to give effect to the penal laws of another, and that the antislav-
ery provisions of the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise
thus could have no effect in Missouri.113 Counsel further urged that Scott's
status as a slave had reattached upon his return to the state under The Slave,
Grace.114 Both arguments had been rejected in Winny and its progeny.
The Missouri high court opened the decision in Scott v. Emerson with
an assertion of international territorial sovereignty: the states of the union
were the equivalent of foreign nations in their municipal relations, and
under international concepts of territorial sovereignty and choice of law,
the laws of one state had no effect in the jurisdiction of another. 1 5 The
court quoted at length from Story's Conflict of Laws, and forcefully as-
serted that it was not obligated to recognize foreign laws that were "preju-
dicial" to the state's own interests.1 16 The question was "a matter of the
comity of nations," and any contrary conclusion would "annihilate the sov-
ereignty and equality of every nation."1 17 Turning to the writings of Chan-
cellor Kent, the court maintained that the principle that acts valid in one
state were valid everywhere applied only to private civil acts, and not to
those that "proceed from the sovereign power." ' 18 The court recognized
113. See Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576, 579-81 (1852).
114. Id.at581.
115. Id. at 583 ("This doctrine is declared and maintained, not only with respect to nations strictly
foreign to each other, but also to the several States of this Union. Every State has the right of determin-
ing how far, in a spirit of comity, it will respect the laws of other States.").
116. Id.
117. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (quoting STORY, supra note 60, §§ 32, 36).
118. Id. at 585 (internal quotations omitted).
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that slave status could be lost when a slave traveled to a free jurisdiction
and was declared free by the local courts. But in the absence of such a de-
cree of manumission, the Grace reattachment principle applied when Scott
returned to Missouri. 119
Justice Gamble dissented vociferously to the court's reversal of its
longstanding approach to choice of law. Gamble invoked foreign practices
across history-from Justinian's Institutes to the rules of English villenage,
Lord Coke, and early Spanish laws-for the proposition that "[i]n all ages,
and in all countries," slaves were regarded as capable of acquiring rights to
freedom through the actions of the master. 120 In the slaveholding states of
the United States as well, the act of the master in traveling to a free juris-
diction was considered a voluntary act of emancipation, and courts had
consistently had applied the law of the place where the right to freedom
was acquired. 121 Indeed, Gamble observed, the Louisiana legislature had
had to adopt positive legislation to establish the Grace reattachment princi-
ple and to override the prevailing American rule (based on Huber) that with
a change of domicile, the status of freedom attached permanently.122 Gam-
ble offered extensive citations to prior decisions of the Missouri and other
state courts, and quoted Winny's reference to Huber.123
Both sides of the state supreme court, in other words, treated the ques-
tion as one governed by international choice of law rules applicable to sov-
ereign nations. Their disagreement turned on the substantive content of
those rules and whether the Missouri court should be bound by its prior
interpretation.
II. THE DRED SCOTT OPINIONS
No official transcript was recorded of the two arguments before the
Court in Dred Scott, and only some of the briefs to the Court have been
preserved, primarily those submitted by the attorneys for Scott.124 Contem-
119. Seeid. at586.
120. Id. at 587 (Gamble, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 588.
122. Id. at 591.
123. Id. at 590.
124. Two oral arguments were held, the first in February 1856 (during the 1855 term), and the
second in December 1856 to consider specific additional questions posed by the Court regarding the
plea in abatement and whether Scott could be a citizen. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT
CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 288-93 (1978). From the February 1856
argument, only the ten-page brief by plaintiff's counsel Montgomery Blair appears to have survived.
See Brief of the Plaintiff, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), reprinted in 3
LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 167 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1978) [hereinafter LANDMARK
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poraneous newspaper accounts shed no light on the issue. The complete
arguments from international authorities that were made to the Court ac-
cordingly are difficult to determine. In particular, the plaintiffs argument
from the law of nations referenced in Chief Justice Taney's due process
analysis appears to have been lost. 125 The briefs and arguments that are
available indicate that counsel for both sides invoked some foreign and
international authority, but not nearly to the extent that foreign sources
were employed by the Justices themselves.
Foreign and international law sources were relied upon by the Justices
primarily with respect to four areas of controversy. The first was whether
Scott, as a black born in the U.S., could be considered a "citizen" for pur-
poses of the Court's Article III, Section 2 diversity jurisdiction over dis-
putes between citizens of different states. The second controversy was the
now familiar choice-of-law question regarding what jurisdiction's law de-
termined Scott's status as free or enslaved-the law of Missouri, Illinois, or
the Minnesota Territory? The third was the question whether Congress
possessed delegated constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the territo-
ries, under the Article IV Territory Clause or otherwise. The final question
addressed whether Fifth Amendment substantive due process prohibited
Congress from outlawing property rights in slaves. Only the first, third, and
fourth of these questions were constitutional ones; the second, choice-of-
law issue was not.
Scott's suit could have been resolved against him narrowly based on
the second, choice-of-law question, which formed the critical element of
his tort claim that he had been wrongfully assaulted and imprisoned by
Sanford. 126 This had been the approach of the Missouri Supreme Court in
the state court proceedings, and Justice Nelson adopted this approach in the
United States Supreme Court. Nelson's concurrence applied the Grace
reattachment principle to hold that Missouri law determined Scott's status
after he returned to that state.
BRIEFS]. From the December 1856 argument, one twelve-page brief by defense counsel Geyer has been
preserved, see Brief for Defendant in Error, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857),
reprinted in 3 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra, at 227 [hereinafter Brief for Defendant], as well as the argu-
ments of Montgomery Blair and George Curtis for the plaintiff, and an additional brief for the plaintiff.
See Argument of Montgomery Blair, of Counsel for the Plaintiff in Error, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), reprinted in 3 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra, at 179 [hereinafter Argument of
M. Blair]; Argument of Mr. Curtis on Behalf of Plaintiff, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1857), reprinted in 3 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra, at 241 [hereinafter Argument of Mr. Curtis];
Additional Brief for Appellant, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), reprinted in 3
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra, at 219.
125. See discussion infra Part lI.D.
126. Scott's owner at the time of the federal suit was John Sanford. The name was misspelled as
"Sandford" in the Supreme Court caption.
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Chief Justice Taney's opinion, which was in some respects the opinion
of the Court, ranged much more broadly, holding with regard to the first
question that Scott, as a black, could never be a citizen capable of suing in
the U.S. courts. The Supreme Court thus lacked jurisdiction over the suit.
Taney also agreed with Nelson that Missouri law controlled the second,
choice of law, issue. Either of these holdings would have resolved the suit
without addressing the politically charged question of the validity of the
Missouri Compromise. Taney nevertheless reached the latter two questions
as well, holding that the Missouri Compromise was invalid because Con-
gress lacked delegated authority to abolish slavery in the territories and that
due process also prohibited Congress from doing so. 127
The remaining members of the Court addressed various aspects of the
first three questions, but only Justice Curtis, in dissent, responded to Chief
Justice Taney with respect to the fourth, due process argument. The follow-
ing section examines the Justices' use of foreign sources in their debates
over each of these questions.
A. Citizenship
A threshold constitutional question posed by the case was whether
Scott was a "citizen" of a state such that he could bring a diversity suit in
the federal courts. If he was not a citizen, the federal courts had no subject
matter jurisdiction over the suit. Perhaps surprisingly, the question whether
free blacks were citizens remained an open one, despite the fact that nearly
a half million free blacks were living in the U.S. at the outbreak of the Civil
War.128 Although the Constitution mentioned citizenship in various places,
it left open the question of who was a citizen, other than to indicate in Arti-
cle II, Section 1 that the President had to be "a natural born Citizen. ' 129
The Constitution therefore implied that citizenship would be acquired by
birth in the United States, but it did not otherwise indicate who could or
would become a citizen, or under what circumstances. In particular, it did
not indicate whether "natural born citizenship" applied to all persons born
on U.S. territory or only to some subset of that population. 130 The Constitu-
tion did not restrict the privileges and immunities of citizenship or the defi-
127. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 124, at 305-14 (discussing Chief Justice Taney's reasons for
reaching all the issues).
128. Randall Kennedy, Dred Scott and African American Citizenship, in DIVERSITY AND
CITIZENSHIP: REDISCOVERING AMERICAN NATIONHOOD 101, 117 n.16 (Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn &
Susan Dunn eds., 1996).
129. Article I, Section 8 also provided that Congress had the power of naturalization.
130. JAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 231
(1978).
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nition of "We the People" to "white" citizens, 131 and free blacks had
formed part of the voting polity that adopted the Constitution in a number
of states. But the Constitution also did not explicitly recognize citizenship
status for persons who were neither aliens nor slaves-e.g., free blacks who
were born in the United States. Whether free blacks were citizens was hotly
contested in the debates over the Missouri Compromise 32 and remained
contentious through the decision in Dred Scott.133 Both sides of the Su-
preme Court looked to foreign authority to some extent in attempting to
answer this question, though foreign sources were used the most exten-
sively by the Justices ruling against Scott.
When the case brought this question to the Supreme Court, Scott's
counsel Montgomery Blair argued that both the Constitution and U.S. prac-
tice recognized that free blacks born in the United States had rights of citi-
zenship. Blair urged that by providing that only natural-born citizens could
be President, the Constitution adopted the British common law principle
that citizenship was based on birth in the country. 134
Blair raised other international authorities, including Vattel's treatise
on The Law of Nations and Justinian's Institutes, in support of the proposi-
tion that free blacks born in the United States must be citizens. Vattel's
treatise recognized that some nations had categories of "perpetual inhabi-
tants" who were neither citizens nor aliens. But Vattel also acknowledged
that England recognized birthright citizenship and that these distinctions
accordingly were "inapplicable to ... the United States." 135 Turning to
Justinian, Blair observed that although Roman law had once withheld citi-
zenship from "freed" (manumitted) persons, by Justinian's era, citizenship
was extended to all. "We have adopted to a great extent the rules of Justin-
ian and the civil law with respect to slavery," Blair argued, "and there is
nothing in the character of our institutions which warrants the establish-
131. Kennedy, supra note 128, at 103-04. See also Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship in the Ameri-
can Constitution, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 369, 369-70 (1973) (discussing concept of citizenship in the Consti-
tution).
132. See Kennedy, supra note 128, at 105-108.
133. In 1839 the Massachusetts legislature protested the imprisonment of Massachusetts citizens
"solely on account of [their] color," while three years later the Georgia legislature resolved that "ne-
groes, or persons, of color, are not citizens of the United States; and that Georgia will never recognize
such citizenship." Id. at 108 (internal quotations omitted); see also KETTNER, supra note 130, at 311-24
(examining pre-Civil War approaches to citizenship of free blacks).
134. Argument of M. Blair, supra note 124, at 187-88.
135. Id. (citing M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE;
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS bk. 1, ch. 19, §§ 212-214, at
162-63); Brief of the Plaintiff, supra note 124, at 175.
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ment here of a less liberal rule on the subject of freedmen."' 136 All of these
authorities supported the conclusion that the Framers would have regarded
free blacks born in the United States as citizens. 137
The sole extant brief for the defendant did not cite foreign authorities
with respect to the citizenship issue.
The citizenship question presented Chief Justice Taney's most nota-
ble, and controversial, invocation of foreign authority in the case.138 In all,
three members of the Court-the Chief Justice (whose opinion was joined
in full by Justice Wayne) and Justice Daniel-explicitly invoked foreign
practice to conclude that persons of African descent could not be citizens of
the United States for the purpose of establishing Article III jurisdiction.
Taney asserted that in "the state of public opinion in relation to that
unfortunate race, which prevailed in the civilized and enlightened portions
of the world at the time of the Declaration of Independence, and when the
Constitution... was framed and adopted," persons of African descent were
"an inferior order... [who] had no rights which the white man was bound
to respect .... 139 According to Taney, this attitude was "fixed and univer-
sal in the civilized portion of the white race" of the day, 140 and was part of
"the public history of every European nation .... ,,141 Taney reasoned that
the drafters of the Declaration of Independence, in calling upon the interna-
tional "opinions of mankind" to recognize the equality of men, could not
have intended to include the descendants of enslaved Africans:
They perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and
how it would be understood by others; and they knew that it would not in
any part of the civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race,
which, by common consent, had been excluded from civilized Govern-
ments and the family of nations, and doomed to slavery. They spoke and
acted according to the then established doctrines and principles, and in
the ordinary language of the day, and no one misunderstood them. 142
Chief Justice Taney asserted that this international understanding was
also reflected in domestic legislation in place during the Founding era.
Thus, "universal" opinion led the Chief Justice to conclude that African
descendents were not embraced by the word "citizens" in the Constitu-
136. Brief of the Plaintiff, supra note 124, at 175 (citing THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, lib. l, tit.
V, § 3).
137. Id.
138. But see Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 16, at 794 (arguing that Chief Justice Taney did not
rely on foreign authority in his constitutional analysis).
139. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857) (emphasis added).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 410.
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tion.1 43 Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri and could not sue in diver-
sity. 144
Justice Daniel echoed this assertion that the practices of civilized na-
tions precluded persons of African descent from being citizens. Daniel
proffered the "truths" that
the African negro race never have been acknowledged as belonging to
the family of nations; that as amongst them there never has been known
or recognised by the inhabitants of other countries anything partaking of
the character of nationality, or civil or political polity; that this race has
been by all the nations of Europe regarded as subjects of capture or pur-
chase .... 145
Daniel's analysis quoted lengthy passages from Vattel regarding the
relationship between citizenship and sovereignty,146 including Vattel's
distinction (from countries where citizenship was based on blood descent)
between "citizens," and "inhabitants." As Vattel put it:
to be of the country, it is necessary to be born of a person who is a citi-
zen; for if he be born there of a foreigner, it will be only the place of his
birth, and not his country. The inhabitants, as distinguished from citi-
zens, are foreigners who are permitted to settle or stay in the country. 14 7
Justice Daniel used this discussion of continental practices to support his
conclusion that a slave could not become a part of the sovereign polity.
Following Montgomery Blair's invitation, Justice Daniel maintained
that U.S. slavery was more analogous to slavery under Roman law than to
English customs, and he devoted several pages to examples from Roman
practice. 148 Daniel quoted Justinian's distinction between "free" and
"freed" men, and the proposition that persons became slaves "either by the
law of nations, as by capture, or by the civil law."'149 Under Roman law, he
contended, emancipation did not automatically confer citizenship, which
143. Id. at 404. In 1858, Taney elaborated on this view in a supplement to his opinion in Dred
Scott, which he drafted "to prove the truth of the historical fact stated in the opinion.., and the princi-
ple decided by the Court." Roger Brooke Taney, Supplement to the Dred Scott Opinion (Sept. 1858), in
SAMUEL TYLER, MEMOIR OF ROGER BROOKE TANEY, L.L.D. 578, 578 (1872). In the supplement,
Taney asserted that it had been the "fixed, unvarying" opinion of the English people for the century
before the Constitution was adopted that blacks were property who had no rights a white man was
obligated to respect. Taney maintained that the same view was held "in Spain, in France, in Holland, in
Denmark, and in Sweden .... It was the unwavering opinion of the civilized world during the period of
which I am speaking." Id. at 593-94.
144. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 426-27.
145. Id. at 475 (Daniel, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 476-77.
147. Id. at 477 (intemal quotations omitted) (quoting VATrEL, supra note 135, at bk. 1, ch. 19
(emphasis added)).
148. Seeid. at477-80.
149. Id. at 479 (quoting THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 136, at lib. I, tit. 3 (emphasis
added)).
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required a separate sovereign act. 150 Daniel acknowledged (as Blair had
argued) that by Justinian's day, "freed" persons were granted citizenship
under Roman law. But Daniel dismissed this practice as contributing to the
fall of the Roman Empire through the "degrad[ing]" of Roman citizen-
ship.151 All of this led Daniel to conclude that blacks were not, and could
never be, members of a political society.152
Chief Justice Taney's approach to the question of citizenship was one
of strict originalism. The duty of the Court, as he saw it, was to administer
the Constitution "according to its true intent and meaning when it was
adopted."'1 53 Thus, while foreign laws and practices might inform the origi-
nal meaning of constitutional terms, their use was limited to that function.
Any subsequent change in public or international opinion was irrelevant.
Taney accordingly insulated his view of constitutional citizenship from the
progressive change in attitudes toward blacks and slavery that had occurred
at home and abroad in the half century since the Founding:
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public opinion or feel-
ing, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized nations of Europe
or in this country, should induce the court to give to the words of the
Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they were in-
tended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. 154
For Chief Justice Taney, the appropriate response to changed attitudes, if
any, was a constitutional amendment. Any other approach "would abrogate
the judicial character of this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popu-
lar opinion or passion of the day."'155
Taney's approach to originalism was not required, however. Even if
one adopts an originalist approach to constitutional interpretation, an alter-
native, organic originalist conception is available. This approach would
view the Framers as having understood that the United States would be a
member of the international community and governed by its rules, that the
Constitution and other U.S. laws should be construed against a backdrop of
international law (either generally or with respect to particular clauses), and
that those international norms would evolve as international law developed.
In other words, an organic originalism would view the Framers as under-
standing that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of an evolving
150. Id. at 478.
151. Id. at 478-80 (internal quotations omitted) (citing 2 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND
FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 81-82 (Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952)
(1825)).
152. Id. at 477, 481.
153. Id. at 405 (opinion of the Court).
154. Id. at426.
155. Id.
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body of international law. 156 The point here is that even an originalist ap-
proach should be open to referencing international authority in constitu-
tional analysis. And perhaps particularly an originalist approach, since the
drafters of our Constitution were heavily influenced by international and
foreign law and would not have drawn many of the sharp distinctions be-
tween American and foreign law that we draw today.
Furthermore, neither Chief Justice Taney nor Justice Daniel provided
support for their asserted "truism" that blacks were not part of the polity of
any civilized state at the time of the Founding, and their position was factu-
ally incorrect. The Chief Justice did not confront the reality, which he him-
self later acknowledged, that civil law countries such as France had long
prohibited slavery on metropolitan soil "and that a negro brought there
became thereby emancipated and free."'157 The 1685 Code Noir specifically
stated that all manumitted slaves would have the same rights and responsi-
bilities as natural born French subjects, although the rights of free blacks in
France and its colonies waxed and waned during the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries. 158 As Taney portrayed it, French law eventually provided
that slaves could be brought from the colonies temporarily under certain
conditions, but if these conditions were not complied with, the black be-
came free. 159 England had no racial restrictions on citizenship, despite the
fact that there were an estimated 14,000 slaves in the country at the time of
the Somerset decision 60 and an uncertain number of free blacks. Other
156. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732-33 (2004) (recognizing international law as
evolving); Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 43 (1934) ("The framers of the
Constitution did not contemplate that the maritime law should remain unalterable."); cf Willard Hurst,
Discussion, The Role of History, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW 59, 61 (Edmond Cahn ed.,
1954) (statement of Paul A. Freund) (observing that constitutional interpretation should recognize that
institutions such as habeas corpus involve an evolutionary or "dynamic element which itself was
adopted by the framers"); Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 37-38
(2004) (recognizing, in the common law context, the evolutionary nature of the common law and noting
that accordingly "[e]ven a strict form of originalism... must acknowledge that the original understand-
ing of some clauses could be fairly read to have included a background assumption of further judicial
development").
157. Taney, supra note 143, at 596.
158. French law from 1716 to 1777 provided that slaves could be brought from the colonies tempo-
rarily under certain conditions, but if these conditions were not complied with, the black became free or
would be returned to the colonies. Parisian courts refused to register these laws, however, and freed
hundreds of slaves throughout the eighteenth century, where they enjoyed the status of French subjects.
SUE PEABODY, THERE ARE NO SLAVES IN FRANCE: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF RACE AND SLAVERY
IN THE ANCIEN REGIME (1996); Email from Sue Peabody, Professor of History, Wash. State Univ.
Vancouver, to author (Mar. 26, 2007) (on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review).
159. Taney, supra note 143, at 596 (citing I WILLIAM BURGE, COMMENTARIES ON COLONIAL AND
FOREIGN LAWS GENERALLY, AND IN THEIR CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER, AND WITH THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 740 (1838)). Taney later dismissed all of the European examples as being motivated not by
the view that slavery was "unjust or immoral," but by the nations' self-interest. Id. at 597.
160. Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 509 (K.B. 1772).
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Latin American colonies and countries, such as Brazil, allowed citizenship
for blacks who owned sufficient property. Moreover, courts in the United
States generally defined "blacks" based on the "one-drop rule" (e.g., any
trace of African blood). But many such persons would have qualified as
citizens in other nations, which recognized citizenship for persons of mixed
blood such as mulattos, quadroons, or the children of European colonists
and Afro-descended women. Haiti's 1805 constitution limited citizenship
to blacks, although later constitutions recognized citizenship more
broadly. 161
Chief Justice Taney likely would have excluded the examples from
Latin America from his category of "civilized" nations. His originalist ap-
proach also would have excluded Haiti, which was founded in 1804 after
the U.S. Constitution was adopted. In 1857, Taney was writing during an
ascendant period of white supremacist racial thought throughout the west
and many whites probably shared his uninformed view of black citizenship.
But even with respect to the practices of the "civilized" nations of England
and France, he was decidedly incorrect in his characterization of black
citizenship.
The two dissenting Justices did not offer contrary evidence of foreign
practice. Instead, Justices McLean and Curtis sought to align the United
States' approach to citizenship with the British tradition of natural-born
citizenship. Echoing Montgomery Blair's argument, Justice Curtis argued
that the Article II, Section 1 requirement that the President be a natural-
born citizen incorporated "that principle of public law, well understood in
this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred
citizenship to the place of birth."'162 Under this principle, "free colored
persons bom within some of the States are.., citizens of the United
States."' 163 Justice Curtis rejected the relevance of Roman law, arguing that
whatever the distinctions regarding freed persons under Roman law, "they
are unknown to our institutions." 164
The dissenters supported their position with the observation that both
before and after the Constitution's adoption, the domestic practice had been
to grant political membership to free blacks in some contexts. 165 Under the
Articles of Confederation, five states had granted blacks political member-
161. CONSTITUTION IMPERIALE D'HAITI, art. 14 (1805), reprinted in RECUEIL GENERAL DES LOIS &
ACTES DU GOUVERNEMENT D'HAITI 1:49 (Linstant de Pradine ed., 1886). This and later Hatian constitu-
tions are available at http://ww.webster.edu/-corbetre/haiti/misctopic/constitutionlistof.htm.
162. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 576 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting); accord id. at 581.
163. Id. at 588.
164. Id. at 573 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 531 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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ship, including the franchise, and free blacks thus were part of the polity
that had ordained and established the Constitution. 166 The U.S. treaties
acquiring California, Florida, and the Louisiana Territory also had be-
stowed citizenship on inhabitants of all races, and such persons had "exer-
cised all the rights of citizens, without being naturalized under the acts of
Congress."167
Justice McLean pointedly objected to Chief Justice Taney and Justice
Daniel's constitutional reification of historical attitudes towards blacks
from home and abroad. In particular, Justice McLean rejected Taney's
static conception of originalism. Constitutional meaning, he believed,
should not be fixed based on historical attitudes toward slavery, such as
those of the Romans, that pre-dated that instrument. "[I]f we are to turn our
attention to the dark ages of the world, why confine our view to colored
slavery?" he asked. "On the same principles, white men were made
slaves."' 168 Justice McLean also rejected Taney's view that attitudes toward
blacks had been monolithically negative at the time of the Framing. James
Madison had been careful to ensure that the word slavery did not appear in
the Constitution, and he had drafted a document that could accommodate
improved attitudes toward blacks and a future end to slavery. The Constitu-
tion thus reflected the mixed attitudes toward slavery that prevailed during
the Founding era. "I prefer the lights of Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, as a
means of construing the Constitution in all its bearings," McLean wrote,
"rather than to look behind that period, into a traffic which is now declared
to be piracy, and punished with death by Christian nations. I do not like to
draw the sources of our domestic relations from so dark a ground."' 169
The arguments over Scott's capacity to be a citizen were framed in
part by the Justices' competing approaches to constitutional interpretation.
Justice McLean began from the presumption that the Constitution was am-
biguous in its treatment of slavery, and he adopted an evolutionary ap-
proach to constitutional construction that allowed for consideration of
progressive changes in attitudes toward blacks, both at home and abroad.
Chief Justice Taney, on the other hand, ignored contrary evidence regard-
ing the status of blacks at the time of the Framing and viewed the Constitu-
tion as cementing a fixed view of blacks as non-citizens that no subsequent
societal changes could alter. Justice Ginsburg has specifically criticized
Chief Justice Taney's originalism here, and particularly his refusal to con-
166. Id. at 572-73, 582 (Curtis, J., dissenting); id. at 533 (McLean, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 533 (McLean, J., dissenting); see also id. at 586 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 538 (McLean, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 537.
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sider later changes in attitudes, as reflecting a jurisprudence "frozen-in-
time." 170
But the Justices' disagreements also turned in part on what foreign
practices the U.S. Constitution embraced regarding slavery and citizenship.
They disagreed about the meaning of natural-born citizenship, including
the extent to which the Constitution embraced the British common law
tradition and the relevance of other foreign attitudes regarding the citizen-
ship of blacks. They also clashed over the relevance of historical practice,
including ancient Roman practices that recognized citizenship for former
slaves. With respect to the question of natural-born citizenship, the argu-
ment was a dress rehearsal for the debate at the end of the century over
whether Chinese descendants and Native Americans could be natural-born
citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment. 171
The debate within the Court over the role and implications of foreign
practices-both historical and contemporary-in determining the citizen-
ship status of freed slaves has interesting parallels to the modem Court's
dialogue over the constitutional protections enjoyed in same-sex relation-
ships. Like the approach of Chief Justice Taney and Justice Daniel, Chief
Justice Burger's concurrence in Bowers v. Hardwick contended that homo-
sexual conduct had been universally condemned by western civilization
and had been a capital crime under Roman law, to support his conclusion
that Georgia's sodomy statute was not unconstitutional. 172 In the litigation
leading to Lawrence v Texas, the Texas appellate court likewise justified its
reaffirmation of Bowers with references to Roman law, Blackstone, and the
ancient Goths, as well as Jewish, Christian, and Islamic traditions. 173 In
reaching the opposite conclusion in Lawrence v. Texas, the members of the
U.S. Supreme Court majority, like Justices McLean and Curtis, contended
that Burger's assumption had been incorrect, since laws prohibiting homo-
sexual sodomy had been declared invalid by the European Court of Human
Rights before the decision in Bowers.174 Justice Kennedy's majority opin-
170. See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 352-53, 355.
171. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (Chinese descendants); Elk v.
Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (Native Americans).
172. See 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (asserting that homosexual sodomy
had been a capital crime under Roman law).
173. Lawrence v. Texas, 41 S.W.3d 349, 361 (Tex. App. 2001) ("Under Roman law, Justinian
states that a lex lulia imposed severe criminal penalties against 'those who indulge in criminal inter-
course with those of their own sex.' Blackstone states that the 'infamous crime against nature, commit-
ted either with man or beast' was a grave offense among the ancient Goths and that it continued to be so
under English common law .... Montesquieu was prompted to conclude that 'the crime against nature'
is a 'crime, which religion, morality, and civil government equally condemn."' (footnotes omitted)).
174. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EUR. CT.
H.R. (ser. A) 149, 164-65 (1981)).
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ion in Lawrence also gave constitutional significance to recent changes in
attitudes toward homosexual conduct, both at home and abroad. 175 Both
cases thus raise questions regarding what historical and modern foreign
sources are relevant to determining constitutional meaning, and the role
that those sources can and should play in originalist or evolutionary ap-
proaches to constitutional interpretation.
Which, if any, Justices were "right" about the foreign sources they se-
lected and the manner in which they used them? Both sides looked to for-
eign practice to define U.S. citizenship. Their disagreement over the
meaning of natural-born citizenship was warranted, since the question was
unresolved in U.S. constitutional law. But Chief Justice Taney's use of
foreign authority was cavalier to the point of disingenuous. The Chief Jus-
tice invoked a "universal" international understanding without evidence to
support it, and he ignored the contrary evidence from both domestic and
foreign practices at the time of the Framing. His rigid approach to original-
ism also led him to ignore any more recent positive developments regard-
ing black citizenship in the U.S. or overseas. Scott's counsel had cited
Roman practice for the proposition that even the Romans had recognized
citizenship for freed slaves. But Justice Daniel dismissed that same practice
as a cause of the collapse of the Roman Empire. Although the definition of
citizenship in the Constitution was unclear, domestic practice as well as
international and foreign practice going back to the Romans recognized
that citizenship could be bestowed on freed slaves and free blacks.
B. Choice of Law
Neither the question of Dred Scott's citizenship nor the constitutional-
ity of the Missouri Compromise had been presented in the Missouri state
court case, and the Missouri Supreme Court addressed only the choice-of-
law issue in denying Scott's tort claim. At the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing
for the defendant, U.S. Senator Henry S. Geyer of Missouri invoked Som-
erset and The Slave, Grace to argue for the reattachment of Scott's
status.176 Montgomery Blair's briefs in turn distinguished Grace, arguing
that where, as in Illinois, the local law explicitly emancipated slaves that
entered the state, a person's enslaved status could not be revived. 177 In
England, by contrast, the local law had been silent. Blair cited Huberus for
175. See id. at 576-77 ("The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral
part of human freedom in many other countries.").
176. Brief for Defendant, supra note 124, at 233-34.
177. See Brief of the Plaintiff, supra note 124, at 168-69; Argument of M. Blair, supra note 124, at
198-99.
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the proposition that the status of liberty controlled in foreign jurisdic-
tions. 178 He invoked Justinian's Institutes for the principle that bestowing
property on a slave impliedly set him free and that "[l]iberty, once admit-
ted, cannot be recalled ... ,"179
All members of the Court appear to have agreed that international con-
flict-of-law principles applied to relations among the several U.S. states
and informed the question whether Scott was a slave or free. The seven
members of the majority also agreed that Missouri law determined Scott's
status once he returned to Missouri, although they took various approaches
to resolving this question. The dissenting Justices McLean and Curtis dis-
agreed with the majority both about the content of the relevant international
law principles and about their application to the facts of Dred Scott's case.
Chief Justice Taney spent little time on this question other than to in-
dicate that the question of whose law controlled was answered in favor of
Missouri by his dicta in Strader. Like the Missouri Supreme Court, Justice
Nelson would have resolved the case exclusively on the choice-of-law
question. His opinion, which was joined by Justice Grier, cited the familiar
territorial jurisdiction principles that "[e]very State or nation possesses an
exclusive sovereignty and jurisdiction within her own territory," and that
"no State or nation can affect or bind property out of its territory."'180 These
principles were "the necessary result of the independence of dis-
tinct... sovereignties."' 81 Illinois law therefore could not determine
Scott's status in Missouri. Nelson also concluded that these international
choice-of-law principles prevented federal law, in the form of the Missouri
Compromise, from having any greater effect on Dred Scott's status than
another state's law once Scott returned to Missouri. Like Chief Justice
Taney's dicta in Strader, Nelson also concluded that these international
choice-of-law principles prevented federal law, in the form of the Missouri
Compromise, from having any greater effect on Dred Scott's status than
another state's law once Scott returned to Missouri. Any other interpreta-
tion would be "subversive of the established doctrine of international juris-
prudence... that the laws of one Government have no force within the
limits of another, or extra-territorially, except from the consent of the lat-
ter."'182 Thus, Missouri municipal law alone determined the effect of for-
178. Brief of the Plaintiff, supra note 124, at 169-70.
179. Id. at 171 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note
136, at lib. 1, tit. 6, § 6).
180. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 460 (1857) (Nelson, J., concurring).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 464.
[Vol 82:393
FOREIGN A UTHORITY
eign law within its jurisdiction. 183 If the Missouri courts declined to recog-
nize any change in Scott's status, that ended the inquiry. Nelson pointed to
The Slave, Grace and other cases to conclude that this position was consis-
tent with decisions from England and other U.S. states. 184
Justice Nelson, as well as Justices Daniel and Campbell, distinguished
Huber and the civil law tradition of finding freedom based on a change in
domicile by holding that Scott had not acquired a new domicile in Illinois
or the federal territory. Nelson concluded that Scott had merely sojourned
in free territory and had remained domiciled in Missouri. Nelson further
noted that even Huberus had recognized that deference to the law of the
place of domicile was only appropriate when that law was consistent with
the law of the forum and not prejudicial to its interests. He finally rejected
Huber altogether, asserting that "this general rule of Huberus, referred to,
has not been admitted in the practice of nations, nor is it sanctioned by the
most approved jurists of international law."1 85
Justice Daniel's concurrence cited Chancellor Kent, Vattel, and
Grotius, among other international law publicists, to contend that the sev-
eral states, like independent nations, enjoyed "perfect equality" under in-
ternational law that protected Missouri from extraterritorial operation of the
rules of other states (e.g., Illinois) 186 or the Missouri Compromise.187
Apparently in response to the dissenters' suggestion that international
law prohibited slavery, Justice Daniel further rejected the contention that
state sovereignty was subject to "some implied and paramount authority of
a supposed international law .... -188 To Daniel, the Missouri Court's rec-
ognition of slavery prevailed over any contrary rule in international law.
His response to Somerset was exceptionalism: Somerset was only relevant
within the realm of England. 189 At any rate, it was superseded by The
Slave, Grace.
183. See id. at460.
184. See id. at 467. Nelson noted that the Maryland courts had rejected the English rule in Somerset
in 1799.
185. Id at 461-62.
186. See id. at 484-85 (Daniel, J., concurring) ("This perfect equality and entire independence of
all distinct States is a fundamental principle of public law. It is a necessary consequence of this equality,
that each nation has a right to govern itself as it may think proper ...."); id. at 486 (arguing that on the
regulation of slavery, states of the Union stand as "nations or Governments entirely separate, and
absolutely independent of each other"); see also id. at 484 (quoting Vattel for the proposition that "no
other nation can compel [a nation] to act in... a particular manner, for any attempt at such compulsion
would be an infringement on the liberty of nations").
187. See id. at 488.
188. Id. at485.
189. Id. at 486.
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Like Justice Nelson, Justice Campbell evaded Huber by contending
that Scott's time on free soil had been a mere sojourn that had not changed
his domicile. Campbell cited examples from "[t]he public law of Europe"
and from U.S. history to demonstrate that slaves who temporarily so-
journed into free jurisdictions with their masters were not liberated. The
international law principle that the status of a person was governed by the
law of the new domicile therefore was inapplicable. 190
Justice Campbell went still further, citing Wheaton and other interna-
tional and domestic authorities for the proposition that slavery was pro-
tected by international law and was preserved unless altered by the positive
law of a new jurisdiction:
It will be conceded, that in countries where no law or regulation prevails,
opposed to the existence and consequences of slavery, persons who are
born in that condition in a foreign State would not be liberated by the ac-
cident of their introgression. The relation of domestic slavery is recog-
nised in the law of nations, and the interference of the authorities of one
State with the rights of a master belonging to another, without a valid
cause, is a violation of that law. 191
Justice Campbell contended that the Constitution incorporated this in-
ternational rule. Contrary to Justice Story's opinion in Prigg that the Fugi-
tive Slave Clause altered international choice-of-law rules, Campbell
opined that the Clause was a constitutional "recognition of this ancient
right [to reclaim a runaway slave], and of the principle that a change of
place does not effect a change of condition."' 192
Campbell acknowledged that the power of a master to reclaim an es-
caped slave had diminished in Europe with the rise of jurisdictions prohib-
iting slavery. William the Conqueror had recognized that a servant's
unimpeded residence in England entitled him to "perpetual liberty."' 193
According to the sixteenth-century French philosopher Jean Bodin, the rule
in France since that era had been that "the slaves of strangers, so soon as
they set their foot within France, become frank and free .... ,,194 Somerset
had also upheld this principle. Campbell questioned the correctness of the
interpretation of English law in Somerset. He then distinguished all of these
foreign precedents as turning on the existence of positive laws prohibiting
slavery. 195 In Scott's case, however, no such positive law had changed his
190. See id. at 494-96 (Campbell, J., concurring).
191. Id. at 495 (citing HENRY WHEATON, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF NATIONS IN EUROPE AND
AMERICA 724 (1845)).
192. Id. at 496.
193. Id.
194. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
195. See id. at 497-99.
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status in the Minnesota Territory, because Congress lacked constitutional
authority to prohibit slavery through the Missouri Compromise. Campbell
further found Scott's circumstances indistinguishable from those in The
Slave, Grace, so that Scott, even if freed by a sojourn onto free soil, had
been reenslaved by his return to Missouri. 196
To prevail on the choice-of-law question, the dissenters had to demon-
strate that Scott had been freed by his residence on free soil and that the
State of Missouri was obligated to respect that freedom. Their positions
drew upon the approach in Somerset as well as the domicile principle from
Huber.
Justice McLean argued at length that international law and practice
recognized slavery only in territories where it was established by positive
municipal law. 197 McLean cited the international law works of Grotius,
Martin, and Phillimore; English legal authority; and practices ranging from
contemporary France and Spain to ancient Rome, to argue that liberty was
acquired when a slave entered a free jurisdiction, and could not be re-
scinded:
The civil law throughout the Continent of Europe, it is believed, without
an exception, is, that slavery can exist only within the territory where it
is established; and that, if a slave escapes, or is carried beyond such terri-
tory, his master cannot reclaim him, unless by some express stipulation.
(Grotius, lib. 2, chap. 15, 5, 1; lib. 10, chap. 10, 2, 1; Wicqueposts Am-
bassador, lib. 1, p. 418; 4 Martin, 385; Case of the Creole in the House of
Lords, 1842; 1 Phillimore on International Law, 316, 335.)
There is no nation in Europe which considers itself bound to return
to his master a fugitive slave, under the civil law or the law of nations.
On the contrary, the slave is held to be free where there is no treaty obli-
gation, or compact in some other form, to return him to his master. The
Roman law did not allow freedom to be sold. An ambassador or any
other public functionary could not take a slave to France, Spain, or any
other country of Europe, without emancipating him ....
... [B]y the general law of nations, no nation is bound to recognise
the state of slavery, .... where it is in opposition to its own policy and in-
stitutions .... If it does it, it is as a matter of comity, and not as a matter
of international right.198
McLean observed that this principle had been recognized in the Somerset
case, which had been decided before the American Revolution and thus
formed part of American law. 199
196. Id. at499-500.
197. Id. at 534 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 594 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 534 (McLean, J., dissenting).
199. Id.
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Conducting a wide survey of practices regarding the treatment of
slaves in free jurisdictions, Justice Curtis found that nations and the several
U.S. states exhibited three different approaches. His analysis is particularly
interesting because he employed domestic and foreign authorities inter-
changeably in examining the different potential solutions to the question.
The first approach was to "dissolve the relation" of master and slave
and terminate the master's rights under the law whence they came. Curtis
portrayed this as the law of France as well as the law of several U.S.
states.200
The second approach was to refuse to assist a master's exercise of
control over the slave, and to prevent the exercise of any authority that
derived solely from the master-slave relationship. Curtis described this law
as the law of both England and Massachusetts. 201
The third was to distinguish between the temporary and permanent
residence of the master and slave in the territory, only the latter of which
would alter a slave's status. "This is said by Mr. Wheaton to be the law of
Prussia, and was formerly the statute law of several States of our Un-
ion. '202 Justice Curtis observed that this third category was only applicable
where no local law directly dissolved the relationship of master and slave.
This was also the situation that gave rise to reattachment in The Slave,
Grace.203 If the British Parliament had adopted an act declaring that a slave
coming to England would no longer be deemed a slave, however, this
would have directly operated to permanently change the status of the slave
to free. 204 To Curtis, the Missouri Compromise was such a law; it was "a
law operating directly on the status of a slave. '205 The law did not simply
fail to protect slavery, as in England Instead the status of slavery was abso-
lutely prohibited. 206 The principle of reattachment was therefore inapplica-
ble.
Justice Curtis further contended that "fundamental principles of pri-
vate international law" provided that a person's status was fixed by the law
of her place of domicile, 207 and that the evidence in the record supported a
finding that Scott's domicile had changed as a result of his time outside of
Missouri. Scott therefore had been rendered free.
200. Id. at 591 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 591-92.
205. Id. at 592.
206. Id. at 593.
207. Id. at 602; see also id. at 595.
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The most difficult part of the dissenters' task was to show that the
Missouri court's determination of Scott's status was not controlling, con-
trary to the dicta in Strader. Here, the dissenters turned forcefully to inter-
national law, arguing that international practices regarding the recognition
of free status could only be overturned by positive state law. Like Justice
McLean, Justice Curtis saw international law as establishing a powerful
principle of comity:
It is generally agreed by writers upon international law, and the rule has
been judicially applied in a great number of cases, that wherever any
question may arise concerning the status of a person, it must be deter-
mined according to that law which has next previously rightfully oper-
ated on and fixed that status208
Curtis recognized that states could affirmatively "depart from a rule of
international law" and refuse to recognize a change in status wrought by
time spent in a foreign jurisdiction.209 But he concluded that Missouri had
not adopted positive laws that would accomplish this result.210 Citing Vat-
tel, both dissenters observed that "[i]n 1816, the common law, by statute,
was made a part of the law of Missouri; and that includes the great princi-
ples of international law."'211 Thus, "in the absence of positive law to the
contrary, the will of every civilized State must be presumed to be to allow
such effect to foreign laws as is in accordance with the settled rules of in-
ternational law."'2 12 Because no Missouri statute altered the international
principle that was operative through the common law, Missouri must rec-
ognize the effect of the law of Illinois and the territories. The Missouri
courts lacked authority themselves to alter the international rule. Under the
common law of Missouri, therefore, Dred Scott had been freed by his resi-
dence in Illinois and the Minnesota Territory.
Part of the disagreement on the Court involved whether the law of Il-
linois or the Missouri Compromise actually wrought freedom on slaves
who resided there. The disagreements on the Court with respect to interna-
tional choice of law then turned, first, to the circumstances under which a
slave was liberated by entering free soil: Was a change of domicile re-
quired? A lengthy sojourn? Or mere presence on free soil? This, in turn, led
to the factual question whether Dred Scott's four-year stay satisfied the
international law requirement. The Justices further disagreed on whether
208. Id. at 595.
209. Id. at 594.
210. ld.at 595,601.
211. Id. at 556-57 (McLean, J., dissenting); see also id. at 595 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (finding that
"[t]he customary law of Missouri is the common law, introduced by statute in 1816," and quoting
Blackstone for the proposition that "the common law adopts, in its full extent, the law of nations ... .
212. Id. at 594 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
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Huberus or The Slave, Grace would be followed with respect to the possi-
bility of reattachment of status when Scott reentered Missouri. Here the
majority and dissent clashed over the relationship between international
rules and Missouri law and the degree of deference that was owed to the
Missouri courts in determining that relationship.
These disagreements were, to a large extent, the product of indetermi-
nance in the choice of law rules of the day, which were in a state of infancy
and flux at the time of the decision. Here, the members of the majority
were riding the modern trend toward territorial absolutism with regard to
conflicts of law, while the dissenters were drawing upon conflicts princi-
ples from an older era that was more willing to respect foreign rules.
C. Congress's Power over the Territories
Although often overlooked by modern commentators, the controversy
over the Article IV Territory Clause also implicated international law.
Since the Louisiana Purchase, the question of Congress's power to govern
the territories, including its power to abolish slavery there, was intertwined
with arguments regarding the powers of sovereigns deduced from interna-
tional law. In the 1828 case of American Insurance Co. v. Canter, Chief
Justice Marshall suggested that Congress's power to govern the territories
either derived from the Territory Clause or was "the inevitable conse-
quence of the right to acquire territory" under international law. 213 Justice
Johnson, sitting as circuit justice below, had concluded that the Territory
Clause applied only to territories in U.S. possession when the Constitution
was adopted. With respect to new territories, only the law of nations lim-
ited Congress's powers of governance.214 In the 1850 case of Benner v.
Porter, the Court suggested that territorial governments were "not organ-
ized under the Constitution, nor subject to its complex distribution of the
powers of government .... -"215
The debate over slavery in the territories raised questions regarding
the source and content of Congress's power there: Did Congress's power
arise from the Territory Clause? Or was it implied from the sovereign
power to acquire territory? And regardless of the source, what was the
scope of that power? Did it involve only authority to make "needful rules
and regulations" for the management and disposal of federal lands, and
213. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) 511, 542-43 (1828); accord Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 332, 336-37
(1810) (stating that Congress's "absolute and undisputed power" to govern territory was either "the
inevitable consequence of the right to acquire and to hold territory" or arose from the Territory Clause).
214. 26 U.S. (I Pet.) at 517 (unnumbered footnote).
215. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 242, 244 (1850).
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thus not extend to regulation of personal rights such as slavery? Or if the
power was more plenary, were Congress's powers of governance in the
territories limited by the Constitution (such that the Due Process Clause
might still protect the institution of slavery), or was Congress limited only
by international law? The debate had broad implications beyond the Dred
Scott case to the power of Congress to govern colonial possessions in the
Insular Cases at the end of the century. 216
In the Dred Scott case, George Curtis, the brother of sitting Justice
Benjamin Curtis, appeared on behalf of Scott to address the territory ques-
tion. Curtis sought to resolve the uncertainty created in American Insurance
Co. v. Canter over whether Congress's power in the territories derived
from international law or from the Territory Clause. He asserted that the
power derived from both. Curtis argued that while the power to acquire
territory through conquest or treaty derived from the Constitution, "[t]he
right to govern ... is derived from and regulated by the law of na-
tions .... -"217 Thus, when the United States acquired new territory through
war or treaty,
they may hold and govern the country acquired in any manner, and for
any length of time in any manner, that they may see fit, so long as they
choose to keep it in the position of a dependency external to the Union.
They may give it a military government or a civil government, or no
government other than the arbitrary will of a proconsul; and this power
continues indefinitely until Congress shall determine that the country
shall be incorporated into the Union.218
This did not mean, however, that Congress exercised power in the
Minnesota Territory unlimited by constitutional due process or other indi-
vidual rights limitations. Curtis read the Article IV Territory Clause in con-
junction with the adjacent New States Clause to conclude that once
Congress determined that the people of a territory could form a state, the
Territory Clause provided the source of Congress's constitutional authority
to establish a temporary government, and "the power to govern them under
the war or treaty power ceases .... ,"219 The Territory Clause, in other
words, only addressed Congress's authority to govern territories destined
for statehood. But at least with respect to those territories, constitutional
limitations on congressional power applied. 220 Curtis read Congress's Arti-
cle IV power with respect to these regions as "plenary" (e.g., reaching the
216. E.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 140 (1904); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244
(1901).
217. Argument of Mr. Curtis, supra note 124, at 278 (emphasis added).
218. Id. at 278-79.
219. Id. at 279.
220. See id. at 259-61.
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scope allowed under international law) except as limited by the Constitu-
tion.221
The brief for Sanford, on the other hand, denied that Congress derived
any power to legislate from the right to acquire. Limited government was a
core tenet of American exceptionalism: "The legislative power of Congress
depends on the constitution, not on the law of nations." "By the laws of
nations the sovereign may change the municipal laws, but Congress repre-
sents the sovereign only to the extent of the powers granted by the constitu-
tion."222
All members of the Court took an "exceptionalist" position on this
point, at least to the extent that they looked to the Constitution rather than
to international law to define the scope of congressional power. Chief Jus-
tice Taney offered his own idiosyncratic (and ahistorical) solution to the
question of the source of Congress's power to govern the territories. Taney
contended that the Territory Clause was limited to the specific territories
held by the United States when the Constitution was adopted. It was "a
special provision for a known and particular territory, and to meet a present
emergency, and nothing more. '223 Taney's conclusion was strategic. It
allowed him to acknowledge the validity of the prohibition on slavery in
the Northwest Ordinance, which established a government for the original
U.S. territory, but to "put aside" that example for the later-acquired terri-
tory as "altogether inapplicable to the case before us."'224
But this did not mean that Congress could not govern new territories.
Having eviscerated the Territory Clause, Chief Justice Taney awkwardly
maintained that the power to govern nevertheless was implied from the
Article IV power to admit new states. 225 But this power must be exercised
consistent with constitutional limitations on the powers of Congress. Here
Taney offered a robust argument from American exceptionalism: Congress
did not possess general despotic powers allowed under international law.
As Taney put it,
[W]hen the Territory becomes a part of the United States, the Federal
Government .... enters upon it with its powers over the citizen strictly
defined, and limited by the Constitution, from which it derives its own
existence, and by virtue of which alone it continues to exist and act as a
Government and sovereignty. [The Government] has no power of any
kind beyond it; and it cannot, when it enters a Territory of the United
221. Id. at 259.
222. Brief for Defendant, supra note 124, at 238.
223. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 432 (1857).
224. Id. at 442.
225. Id. at 443.
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States, put off its character, and assume discretionary or despotic powers
which the Constitution has denied to it.226
Taney concluded that the Bill of Rights applied equally to Congress's
actions in the territories. 227 He accordingly rejected the possibility that the
United States could govern territories as colonies:
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to the Federal
Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance, to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure; nor
to enlarge its territorial limits in any way, except by the admission of
new States.... [No power is given to acquire a Territory to be held and
governed permanently in that character. 228
Taney thus denied that the Constitution gave the United States any enumer-
ated power to govern territories other than in preparation for statehood. In
his view, "citizens of the United States who migrate to a Territory belong-
ing to the people of the United States, cannot be ruled as mere colo-
nists .... "229 He concluded, somewhat obliquely, that Congress lacked
delegated power to prohibit slavery in the territories. 230
All the Justices apparently agreed with Taney's view that the
Constitution's principles of limited and delegated powers applied in the
territories. 231 No member of the Court adopted the position that Congress's
power to govern territories derived from international law unimpeded by
the Constitution. Taney failed to garner a majority, however, for the view
that the Territory Clause was restricted to the original U.S. territories.232
226. Id. at 449.
227. Seeid. at450-51.
228. Id. at 446, 448. Justice Campbell concurred in this view:
I look in vain, among the discussions of the time [of the Constitution's adoption], for the as-
sertion of a supreme sovereignty for Congress over the territory then belonging to the United
States, or that they might thereafter acquire. I seek in vain for an annunciation that a consoli-
dated power had been inaugurated, whose subject comprehended an empire, and which had
no restriction but the discretion of Congress.... I find nothing to authorize these enormous
pretensions ....
Id. at 505 (Campbell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
229. Id. at 447 (opinion of the Court). Taney also acknowledged that the United States could ac-
quire territory with inhabitants unfit for immediate statehood and govern it as a territory "until it was
settled and inhabited by a civilized community capable of self-government ..... Id. at 448.
230. Id. at 450 (holding that the power to prohibit slavery is "not only not granted to Congress but
[is] in express terms denied"); see also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 124, at 373-79 (discussing Taney's
analysis of Congress's power in the territories).
231. See, e.g., Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 542 (McLean, J., dissenting) ("In organizing the
Government of a Territory ..... [n]o powers can be exercised which are prohibited by the Constitution,
or which are contrary to its spirit .... ); id. at 614 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's
power in the territories "finds limits in the express prohibitions on Congress not to do certain
things ....").
232. Three members of the majority and both dissenters rejected Taney's position. See id. at 489
(Daniel, J., concurring); id. at 501 (Campbell, J., concurring); id. at 519-21 (Catron, J., concurring); id.
at 540-42, 544 (McLean, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress's power to legislate arose from the
Territory Clause and the power to conquer territory); id. at 613 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (ridiculing Taney
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Justices Daniel, Campbell, and Catron simply contended that Con-
gress's delegated authority under the Territory Clause did not include the
power to prohibit slavery. 233 Justice Campbell elaborated further to argue
that the Clause could not be read as bestowing general powers of govern-
ance in the territories, as the British or Europeans might have construed
it.234 Instead, Campbell asserted an exclusively American understanding of
the power to "make rules and regulations," which was informed by the
American struggle against authoritarian British rule. 235 In a forceful asser-
tion of American exceptionalism, he asked,
Are these words to be understood as the Norths, the Grenvilles, Hillsbor-
oughs, Hutchinsons, and Dunmores-in a word, as George III would
have understood them-or are we to look for their interpretation to Pat-
rick Henry or Samuel Adams, to Jefferson, and Jay, and Dickinson; to
the sage Franklin, or to Hamilton, who from his early manhood was en-
gaged in combating British constructions of such words? 2 3 6
According to Campbell, under the American system of limited and
delegated powers, the Territory Clause delegated to Congress only a lim-
ited power to preserve and dispose of the public domain in the territories; it
did not include power to change the status of persons. The power to define
property in persons had been reserved to the states, and the Territory
Clause "confer[red] no power upon Congress to dissolve the relations of
the master and slave on the domain of the United States, either within or
without any of the States. ' '237
Justice Catron limited his opinion to addressing the invalidity of the
Missouri Compromise. He concluded that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause affirmatively prevented Congress from prohibiting slavery in the
territories. 238 Congress could no more ban slavery there than it could ex-
clude cattle, horses, tools, or any other form of property. 239
Catron believed, however, that international law, in the form of the
treaty power, could give Congress power to prohibit slavery in a terri-
tory.240 Thus, Virginia, as the equivalent of a sovereign nation, had validly
contracted with the other twelve states to prohibit slavery in the territories
for rejecting the Territory Clause but nevertheless implying the authority to govern from "suppositious
powers" found nowhere in the Constitution).
233. See, e.g., id. at 488-92 (Daniel, J., concurring).
234. See id. at 509-17 (Campbell, J., concurring).
235. See id. at 511-13.
236. Id. at 511.
237. Id. at 517.
238. See id. at 527 (Catron, J., concurring).
239. Id.
240. See id. at 523, 528.
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it ceded to the Union prior to the Constitution,241 thereby legitimating the
Northwest Ordinance. France could have imposed a similar restriction on
the Louisiana Purchase as a condition of cession, and Congress thereby
would have been both empowered and obligated by the treaty to prohibit
slavery in that region while it remained a territory.2 42 (Catron did not ex-
plain why the Privileges and Immunities Clause would not still have pre-
vented Congress from adopting such legislation.) By promising the
inhabitants "free enjoyment" of their property (including property in
slaves), however, the Treaty of Paris had done the opposite. Catron felt that
the treaty stood "protected by the Constitution" and could not be repealed
by Congress.243 The provision in the Missouri Compromise prohibiting
slavery in part of that territory thus violated both the United States' treaty
obligation and the equality of privileges and immunities. 244 Catron accord-
ingly appeared to argue both that Congress could not supersede treaties by
later-in-time legislation and that the treaty power could override explicit
constitutional limitations on congressional power. He thus adopted an un-
derstanding of the treaty power more robust than that articulated in Mis-
souri v. Holland.245
In dissent, Justices McLean and Curtis both considered Congress's
power over territories to be broad-certainly broad enough to prohibit
slavery. Both dissenters agreed that Congress could not exercise powers, in
the territories or elsewhere, that the Constitution prohibited. 246 But the
dissenters found nothing in that document that withheld from Congress the
power to prohibit slavery.
The international law arguments offered by the plaintiff with respect
to territorial governance thus were not embraced by the Dred Scott Court.
To this extent, the "exceptionalist" approach with respect to power in the
territories was accepted by all members of the Court. Principles of dele-
gated powers and limited government were applicable there, as well as
elsewhere.
Chief Justice Taney's conclusion that the Constitution limited Con-
gress's powers of governance in the territories governed this question for
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 528.
244. Id. at 528-29.
245. 252 U.S. 416 (1920); see also Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance
and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313, 315 (2001).
246. Dred Scott, 393 U.S. (19 How.) at 542 (McLean, J., dissenting); id. at 623 (Curtis, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing that Congress's discretion was limited by "those positive prohibitions to legislate, which
are found in the Constitution").
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the next half century. The revival of international law arguments in territo-
rial governance would have to await another day, in the Insular Cases. In
the meantime, the choice between international law versus the American
exceptionalist approach did not resolve the question of Congress's power to
prohibit slavery. The members of the Court agreed that congressional pow-
ers were limited by the Constitution and were not defined by international
law free of constitutional constraint. But within this exceptionalist frame-
work, the Justices still divided over whether or not Congress's limited
powers included the power to prohibit slavery.
D. Due Process and Property in Slaves
The discussion to this point has focused on the role of international
and foreign authority in determining the validity of slavery, the obligation
of governments to recognize it, and their authority to prohibit it. But inter-
national law arguments also informed nineteenth-century discussions of
slavery from an individual rights perspective.
The principle that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause provided
a basis for invalidating legislation on substantive grounds was nascent at
the time of the Dred Scott decision.247 But the authority of courts to invali-
date legislation on the grounds of "vested rights" or "law of the land"
clauses, based on principles of universal law, was well established. 248 Emi-
nent domain jurisprudence in the early to mid-nineteenth century also was
informed by a blending of international law and natural law principles. 249
247. But see Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856) (finding violative of due process a state
statute criminalizing the possession of alcohol for any reason and requiring the destruction of alcohol
upon conviction, even if legally possessed prior to enactment of the statute).
248. See, e.g., Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941.
249. In Gardner v. Trustees of Newburgh, for example, Chancellor Kent relied upon Grotius,
Pufendorf, Bynkershoek, and Blackstone for the proposition that just compensation was owed for
damage to or takings of property even where no constitutional provision required it, and that the power
of eminent domain was limited to takings for "public purposes" 2 Johns. Ch. 161, 166-167 (N.Y. Ch.
1816) (citing HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS, bk. 8, ch. 14, § 7 (1775); SAMUEL PUFENDORF,
DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM, bk. 8, ch. 5, § 7 (1688); CORNELIS VAN BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONES
JURIS PUBLICI, bk. 2, ch. 15 (1737)). On the issue of takings for public purposes, see Varick v. Smith, 5
Paige Ch. 136, 146-47 (N.Y. Ch. 1835); 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 339-40
(Charles M. Barnes ed., 13th ed. 1884); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before
the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 377-79 (1911). See also Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 44
(1847) (unanimously concluding that the eminent domain principle in the Fifth Amendment "does not
create or declare any new principle of restriction .... but simply recognize[s] the existence of a great
common law principle, founded in natural justice, especially applicable to all republican governments,
and which derived no additional force.., from being incorporated into the Constitution ...."); Henry
v. Dubuque & Pac. R.R. Co., 10 Iowa 540, 544 (1860) (finding the protection of property to be "a right
which a written constitution may recognize and declare, but which existed independently of and before
such recognition, and which no government can destroy"). See generally J.A.C. Grant, The Natural Law
Background of Due Process, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 56 (1931).
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Both pro- and antislavery constitutional theorists in the antebellum era
argued that principles of fundamental rights such as due process supported
their positions, and international and natural law arguments informed their
analysis. 250 Proslavery advocates invoked natural law concepts of property
rights, as well as historical foreign precedents, to argue that property in
slaves was protected by due process. Thus, U.S. Senator William Smith of
South Carolina argued that slavery was "universal throughout history, sanc-
tioned by the Bible, [and] honored by the Greeks .... ,,251 Others empha-
sized that the Constitution gave slaveholders vested rights in slaves as a
form of property that could not be abolished. 252
Explicit substantive due process arguments appeared in proslavery
opposition to Congress's prohibition of slavery in the 1820 Missouri Com-
promise. 253 Representative Smyth of Virginia argued that the compromise
violated the constitutional principle that
"no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public use without just compensa-
tion."... [I]f you cannot take away the land, you cannot take the future
crops; and if you cannot take the slaves, you cannot take their issue, who,
by the laws of slavery, will be also slaves. You cannot force the people
to give up their property. You cannot force a portion of the people to
emancipate their slaves 254
In the 1836 debates over prohibiting slavery in the District of Columbia,
Representative Charles Pinckney of South Carolina reasserted the due
process objection. Pinckney's report to Congress argued that abolition of
slavery in the District would be "directly repugnant to the principles of
natural justice and of the social compact" and inconsistent with the Fifth
Amendment. 255 Pinckney quoted Vattel's observation that "the peaceful
possession of property" was "[t]he great end of civil society," as a "great
250. See EARL M. MALTZ, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 8
(2003). Arguments from equal protection and privileges and immunities were offered by slavery theo-
rists as well. See id. at 34-50
251. 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION 150 (1990).
252. MALTZ, supra note 250, at 8.
253. In 1819, Representative McLane objected to an effort to ban slavery in the Arkansas territory
on the grounds that Congress could not destroy property rights in slaves. 34 ANNALS OF CONG. 1229-
30(1819).
254. 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 998 (1820); see also 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1492, 1521 (1820). Mr.
Scott of Missouri:
Let the restriction become a law, and the emigrant would stand attainted and convicted of a
crime that operated a forfeiture of his property, if he removed to the State of Missouri, and
took his slaves with him; and that amendment to the 5th article of the Constitution which de-
clared that no person should be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due course of
law, became inoperative, and the citizen was divested of his property without Constitution, or
law, or judge, or jury.
255. H.R. REP. NO. 24-691, at 14 (1836).
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principle[]" that was "expressly incorporated in the Constitution. '256
Pinckney doubted that abolishing slavery could be considered a taking for
"public use," but even if it were, it required just compensation.
The same year, Representative John C. Calhoun of South Carolina of-
fered a due process justification for the proposed gag rule on antislavery
petitions in the House. Foreshadowing the argument of Chief Justice Taney
in Dred Scott, Calhoun urged that the Fifth Amendment recognized that
"no man shall be deprived of his liberty or property without due process of
law. The property of the citizen cannot be taken from him but by process of
law-by a trial by jury, and were not.., slaves ... property?" 257 Justice
Baldwin's concurrence in Groves v. Slaughter also asserted that because
slaves were "property by the law of any state, the owners are protected
from any violations of the rights of property by Congress, under the fifth
amendment of the Constitution .... ",258 These arguments found support in
the fact that when Great Britain prohibited slavery in the British colonies in
1833, Parliament had appropriated £20 million as compensation for the
dispossessed slaveholders.
Due process arguments were not limited to the proslavery side. For
abolitionists, the relevant substantive value protected by due process was
liberty, not property. Following the lead of Salmon P. Chase, abolitionists
contended from 1844 onward that recognition of slavery in the territories
violated slaves' due process rights. Abolitionists reasoned that under Som-
erset, property in humans was a peculiar form of property. It was purely a
creation of municipal law and violated natural law. Recognition of slavery
in the territories thus violated the person's natural, vested right to liberty. 259
The battle over whether due process protected or prohibited slavery
spurred an aggressive debate over whether constitutional due process ap-
plied in the territories at all-a debate that for some traveled hand-in-hand
with the debate over the source and nature of Congress's authority in the
territories. If Congress possessed delegated power to abolish slavery in the
territories, did the Due Process Clause nevertheless prohibit it from doing
so? The argument placed antislavery forces in the position of arguing that
due process did not protect slavery, or, more awkwardly, that constitutional
256. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
257. CONG. GLOBE, 24th Cong., 1st Sess., 81 (1836); see also I FREEHLING, supra note 251, at 322
(quoting 13 THE PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 25 (Clyde N. Wilson ed., 1979)).
258. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 515 (1841) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
259. MALTZ, supra note 250, at 8 & n.13; see also 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1306, 1310-11 (1798) (Mr.
Thatcher of Massachusetts, arguing that the U.S. government could not establish slavery in the Missis-
sippi territory because "by nature these enslaved men are entitled to rights .... ); 35 ANNALS OF CONG.
1114, 1135 (1820) (Rep. Hemphill of Pennsylvania supporting a provision emancipating children born
in Missouri on the basis of "natural rights").
442 [Vol 82:393
FOREIGN A UTHORITY
due process did not apply to the territories at all and that Congress's power
was relatively unlimited there. 260
Due process receives very limited treatment in the existing Supreme
Court briefs from Dred Scott, though George Curtis's argument to the
Court suggests that the topic received greater treatment in oral argument.
According to Curtis's argument in the second hearing on the case, Reverdy
Johnson, one of the leading constitutional law advocates of the day and a
close friend of Chief Justice Taney, argued aggressively for Sanford that
the Due Process Clause prohibited Congress from banning slavery in the
territories. Congress could only exercise such power based on the "extrava-
gant" notion that the Due Process Clause did not apply and that Congress
exercised unlimited power there. The view that Congress could outlaw
slavery in the territories meant that citizens entering a territory would move
into "the pale of an enormous, unlimited, and irresponsible power, and so
subject themselves to an 'inequality.' 261 Sanford's consideration of due
process otherwise was limited to the final sentence of Henry Geyer's brief,
which observed that it was neither "just [n]or defensible ... to deprive any
citizen of his right to remove to a country... with any property recognized
by the constitution of the United States and protected by the local laws. '262
The existing briefs and arguments by counsel for Scott did not raise
foreign authorities in their due process analysis. Indeed, according to the
available record, Montgomery Blair's discussion of due process was lim-
ited to a single page.263 Chief Justice Taney's opinion nevertheless sug-
gests that Scott's counsel made an international law argument, as discussed
below. Both Blair and Curtis conceded that due process applied in the terri-
tories (at least in territories destined for statehood). 264 Counsel for Scott
denied, however, that the Due Process Clause prevented Congress from
outlawing slavery. Instead, a consistent line of legislation since the North-
west Ordinance demonstrated that the Framers, and later, legislators, had
260. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the
Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1, 189-191
(2002). Properly understood, the question "Did the Constitution apply to the territories at all?" was a
red herring. The Constitution unquestionably applies wherever the U.S. government acts. Certain
constitutional provisions, such as the right of "states" to a republican form of government, are geo-
graphically defined and do not apply in all contexts, while other general limitations on government
power surely do. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 5-6 (1996).
261. Argument of Mr. Curtis, supra note 124, at 259.
262. Brief for Defendant, supra note 124, at 239.
263. See Additional Brief for the Appellant, supra note 124, at 225-26.
264. See Argument of Mr. Curtis, supra note 124, at 261; Additional Brief for Appellant, supra
note 124, at 225.
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presumed that Congress had power to legislate over slavery there without
violating due process.
As elaborated below, due process also received very limited treatment
from the Court. Justice Catron viewed slavery in the territories as protected
by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. But only the opinions of Chief
Justice Taney and Justice Curtis addressed constitutional due process. 265 As
Don Fehrenbacher observed, even Chief Justice Taney's opinion did not
appear completely committed to the due process argument. 266
Roger Taney has been celebrated by some modem commentators for
declining to consider foreign authorities in his due process analysis. 267 The
Chief Justice explicitly rejected consideration of arguments from the law of
nations on the critical question whether slaves were "property" within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. He addressed the
question as follows:
It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a difference be-
tween property in a slave and other property, and that different rules may
be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States. And
the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon
the relation of master and slave and their mutual rights and duties, and
the powers which Governments may exercise over it, have been dwelt
upon in the argument.
But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind
that there is no law of nations standing between the people of the United
States and their Government, and interfering with their relation to each
other. The powers of the Government, and the rights of the citizen under
it, are positive and practical regulations plainly written down. The people
of the United States have delegated to it certain enumerated powers, and
forbidden it to exercise others. It has no power over the person or prop-
erty of a citizen but what the citizens of the United States have granted.
And no laws or usages of other nations.., can enlarge the powers of the
Government, or take from the citizens the rights they have reserved And
if the Constitution recognises the right of property of the master in a
slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and
other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal... has a right to draw
such a distinction ....
... [N]o word can be found in the Constitution which gives Con-
gress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of
that kind to less protection than property of any other description.268
265. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 435-36, 449-51 (1857); id. at 624, 626-
27 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
266. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 124, at 381-82 (describing Taney's due process contribution
as "meager and somewhat obscure").
267. See Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 16, at 794.
268. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451-52 (emphasis added).
[Vol 82:393
FOREIGN AUTHORITY
Taney thus rejected the contention that "the laws and usages of na-
tions, and the writings of eminent jurists" established "a difference between
property in a slave and other property" which might be relevant to the con-
struction of the Fifth Amendment. Due process therefore confirmed Con-
gress's inability to eliminate property rights in slaves in the territories, and
the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional. 269
Chief Justice Taney's argument is provocative for modem purposes,
because it rejects the suggestion that international law is relevant to the
construction of constitutional due process. The claim resounds with con-
temporary American exceptionalism viewpoints in cases such as Lawrence
v. Texas and Roper v. Simmons.270 His statement on this point, however, is
something of a cipher. Most of the parties' arguments regarding the inter-
national law status of slavery were directed at the three questions examined
previously. The extant briefs and arguments for the plaintiff did not raise an
international law argument regarding property in slaves. Because most of
the oral argument was not recorded, it is unclear precisely what argument
from the law of nations Chief Justice Taney was referencing.
It appears likely, though, that Taney was responding to the interna-
tional law argument, going back to the Somerset case, that slavery was a
unique form of property that existed only as a matter of positive law. Some
support for this proposition may be gleaned from Justice Curtis's response
to the Chief Justice. Curtis argued that Congress's abolishment of slavery
in the Missouri Compromise had altered Dred Scott's status as a slave "in
conformity with the rules of international law." These rules recognized that
the status of a slave was determined by positive law, and that, consistent
with the international rule, nothing in the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause limited Congress's power to abolish slavery.271 Justice McLean also
maintained that slavery was a peculiar form of property, since no other
form of property depended so entirely on the municipal law of the jurisdic-
tion.272 Arguments that slaves constituted a special (and less protected)
form of property had appeared in The Antelope and La Jeune Eugenie, and
269. Don Fehrenbacher carefully parses Taney's analysis here to observe that Chief Justice Taney
never explicitly declared the Missouri Compromise in violation of the Fifth Amendment, though the
implication was clear. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 124, at 382-84.
270. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
view "that American law should conform to the law of the rest of the world.., ought to be rejected out
of hand"); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's
reference to foreign authority as "dangerous" and "meaningless dicta").
271. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 601, 624-25 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
272. See id. at 548-49 (McLean, J., dissenting).
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had been rejected by Justice Baldwin's concurrence in Groves v. Slaugh-
ter.273 But Taney's precise meaning is unclear.
Taney's argument that the law of nations could not "enlarge" the dele-
gated powers of the government, moreover, begged the question of the
proper relationship between international law and the Constitution on the
specific issue before the Court. Arguing that constitutional powers should
not be "enlarged" assumes that the constitutional powers have a preexisting
content that international law is altering. But it does not resolve the ques-
tion of whether the constitutionally delegated powers and rights themselves
are informed by international norms. As Taney put it, "if the Constitu-
tion ... makes no distinction" between slavery and other forms of property,
then no court could rely upon international law to "draw such a distinc-
tion."
But whether the Constitution protected slavery equally with other
forms of property was precisely the question at issue. The Constitution was
at least ambivalent on this point. It did not mention slavery explicitly and
treated slaves as "persons" rather than "property" for purposes of the Mi-
gration Clause, the Three-Fifths Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause. If
the Due Process Clause was ambiguous on the question of whether it pro-
tected slavery equally with other forms of property, as many in the era be-
lieved,274 then international law distinctions between property in slaves and
other forms of property recognized by natural law could well be relevant to
the constitutional question at issue. It was Taney's answer to this ques-
tion-that "the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly af-
firmed in the Constitution"275-that made any contrary understanding of
property in slaves under international law irrelevant. Taney's elision of the
interpretive question and his own answer to it thus denied any role for in-
ternational law.
Taney's assertion that "no law of nations" stood between the Ameri-
can people and their government also cannot be understood as a blanket
assertion that he viewed international and foreign authority as irrelevant to
constitutional analysis. Taney himself had invoked foreign authority in the
same case in determining the original understanding of "citizen" in the
273. See Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 514 (1841) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
274. See ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149-
58 (1975) (discussing differences of opinion among abolitionists regarding whether the Constitution
protected or undermined slavery); see also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 24, at 4-9 (describing debates
in the pre-Civil War Congress over whether slaves were property); WINTHROP D JORDAN, WHITE
OVER BLACK 322-24 (1968) (discussing debate over slaves as property at the constitutional conven-
tion).
275. DredScott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 451.
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Constitution. In other cases, Taney recognized that international law could
provide substantive content for constitutional principles. In Holmes v. Jen-
nison, for example, he correctly argued that the scope of the Treaty Clause
was defined by international law, to the extent that international rules were
"consistent with the nature of our institutions, and the distribution of pow-
ers between the general and state governments. '276 In the 1852 case of
Kennett v. Chambers, he found that the duty of a citizen to be at war with
its government's enemy was "universally acknowledged by the laws of
nations. '277 In Fleming v. Page, Taney agreed that in a military occupation
the United States possessed powers recognized by the international laws of
war and conquest. 278 And in sweeping dicta in United States v. Rogers,
Taney asserted that the international law doctrine of discovery gave Con-
gress plenary authority over Native American tribes.279 In other words,
Chief Justice Taney apparently took a question-by-question approach to the
relationship between international law and constitutional analysis.
Taney's assertion in Dred Scott that the national government did not
enjoy the full panoply of powers held by sovereign nations, given the "pe-
culiar" limited sovereignty of the national government, is fully consistent
with this approach. Conceding that the Constitution limits the national gov-
ernment to fewer powers than those enjoyed by other eighteenth-century
governments says nothing about the extent to which the powers conferred
by the Constitution, or the limits imposed by that instrument, remain in-
formed by international rules. It simply recognizes that the operation, if
any, of international rules is filtered through principles of limited govern-
ment established by the nation's founding document.
It is also interesting that the Chief Justice was willing to consider for-
eign authority in construing citizenship for purposes of Article III, but de-
nied the relevance of international law to his construction of due process.
An originalist approach might have suggested that foreign and international
rules were, in fact, relevant to due process. Somerset had been decided
nearly twenty years before the Fifth Amendment was adopted. English law
had a fully developed concept of due process and takings without just com-
pensation. And yet nothing-not even the decision in The Slave, Grace-
276. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 569 (1840).
277. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38, 50(1852).
278. See 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 614-18 (1850).
279. 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 571-72 (1846); see also Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 409
(1842) (Taney, C.J.) ("[A]ccording to the principles of international law.... the Indian tribes in the new
world were regarded as mere temporary occupants of the soil, and the absolute rights of property and
dominion were held to belong to the European [discoverer] .... ). See Cleveland, supra note 260, at
44-47 (discussing use of international law in Rogers).
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suggested that Lord Mansfield's conclusion that English law did not recog-
nize slavery violated due process. Mansfield's decision also suggested that
slavery's status under international law was relevant to its legality. Recog-
nizing that the American principle of due process derived from the English
one, tracing back to the Magna Carta, international and English authority
should have been relevant even to an originalist due process analysis. 280
But the idea that due process protected slavery had been crafted by pro-
slavery advocates in the 1820s and 1830s. Taney did not offer an originalist
justification for his interpretation of due process.
Justice Curtis was the only other member of the Court to address the
due process argument. Curtis responded to Chief Justice Taney's assertion
that Congress lacked power to outlaw slavery in the territories by invoking
the Prigg/Somerset truism that slavery was purely a creation of positive
law, without foundation in the law of nature or the common law. 28 1 Curtis
cited Burge's treatise on Colonial and Foreign Laws for the proposition
that the positive-law character of slavery was unquestioned. 282 Curtis as-
serted that the Framers of the Constitution must have known that the rights
and duties of the slave and slaveholder were purely creations of positive
law, and that the Framers accordingly must have given Congress power to
regulate slavery in the territories, including the right to abolish it. Other-
wise, the rights and duties of slaves and slaveholders in the territories
would continue to be governed by the different laws of the states where
they had previously resided, creating a legal cacophony unknown to the
law of any other civilized country. 283 Curtis did not otherwise hint at inter-
national law implications for due process. He instead argued that the prin-
ciple of due process had descended from the Magna Carta, and was
common to the law of all the U.S. states when the Northwest Ordinance
was adopted. Northern states had laws prohibiting slavery, and slavehold-
ing states had laws that freed foreign slaves who entered the state. Yet nei-
ther these laws, nor Congress's laws prohibiting the slave trade, had ever
been considered to violate due process. 284
280. In his supplement to the Dred Scott opinion, Taney reinterpreted English precedents as stand-
ing only for the proposition that slaves were a particular form of property that could not be imported
into England, not that in England slaves were free. See Taney, supra note 143, at 594. Even at the time
of Somerset, English slave trade laws regarded slaves as property, as The Slave, Grace later recognized.
Id. at 597.
281. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 624 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
282. Id. at 624 (citing I BURGE, supra note 159, at 738-41).
283. See id. at 625-26.
284. Id. at 627.
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III. LESSONS
American slavery by 1857 was a "peculiar institution"-an increas-
ingly exceptional practice within the international community. The Consti-
tution was also exceptional in defining the powers and limitations of the
national government. And yet much of American law was drawn from for-
eign and international law of the era, creating a tension between the excep-
tional and transnational character of American law that remains to this day.
A fundamental question posed by the Dred Scott case was the extent to
which the Constitution reified America's peculiar approach to slavery. In
other words, was the protection of slavery itself an element of American
constitutional exceptionalism? Or did the Constitution allow Congress to
abolish the peculiar institution, at least in the territories?
Members of the Court embraced a transnationalist approach to most of
the questions posed by the case. Justices on both sides of the citizenship
question looked to foreign authority, though they disagreed over what for-
eign sources were relevant. All members of the Court who extensively
considered the choice-of-law question agreed that international practices
informed the U.S. approach. Chief Justice Taney staked out an explicitly
exceptionalist position on the due process question, but that position was
challenged by Justice Curtis. The Territory question was the only question
for which all members of the Court treated the U.S. as exceptional. The
Justices uniformly agreed, implicitly or explicitly, that whatever powers of
government a nation might possess over its territory under international
law, in the United States those powers were filtered and limited by the
Constitution.
What is to be learned by modem readers from the uses of foreign au-
thority in Dred Scott? The case offers at least three lessons. First, the mem-
bers of the Court generally were highly transnational in their approach. The
comfort and frequency with which foreign and international law was con-
sidered by the Justices suggests that they had a fluid view of the relation-
ship between U.S. law and the law of other nations. To a significant extent,
U.S. law was not, and could not be, sharply distinguished from foreign and
international law. United States law was built upon, and permeated by,
concepts and principles derived from other locales, and it continued to be
impacted by legal developments elsewhere. A bright line distinction be-
tween "American" and "foreign" law therefore was often elusive. Ameri-
can law, in other words, was not considered to be as exceptional by
members of the Dred Scott Court as many people today assume it to be.
Given this perspective, it is not surprising that members of the nine-
teenth-century Court generally viewed foreign and international authorities
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
as legitimate sources of constitutional analysis. These sources were a com-
mon and accepted part of constitutional discourse; they were viewed as part
of the constitutional canon. Consideration of foreign sources thus did not
inject "integrity-anxiety" about the legitimacy of constitutional analysis,
though a foreign source might prove irrelevant to any particular question if
a constitutional provision precluded the approach that foreign law sug-
gested.
Arguments from foreign authority that were in play in the case drew
upon lengthy traditions from abroad that did not sharply distinguish be-
tween international and foreign comparative law. Huber's choice-of-law
principles, for example, represented the views of the Netherlands school of
choice of law. Today we would think of them more as comparative foreign
rules than as principles of international law. Huber, however, derived his
principles from his understanding of international law, and the members of
the Court treated the principles as international, rather than comparative
authority. The fact that the practices of nations were (and remain) evidence
of international rules simply further blended distinctions between the for-
eign and the international.
Just as the Court did not distinguish sharply between international law
and foreign law, it also did not sharply distinguish between constitutional
and statutory or common law interpretation. Invocations of foreign author-
ity were equally acceptable to members of the Court in each of these con-
texts. United States statutory and common law practices could be
"exceptional" or distinct from foreign practice, just as constitutional provi-
sions could be. And constitutional analysis was not to be peculiarly insu-
lated from the influence of foreign law.
Furthermore, international and foreign law were understood as rele-
vant to many aspects of our constitutional regime that today are often con-
sidered exceptional, including principles of limited government,
federalism, and individual rights. Foreign authority was applied in each of
these areas. With respect to limited government, the Justices frequently
stressed the unique aspects of the American system as a national govern-
ment of delegated powers. But various Justices also recognized that the
national government possessed many powers analogous to those of foreign
sovereigns which were informed by international law. Chief Justice Taney
and Justice Daniel as well as the dissenters took this approach with respect
to governmental powers in relation to citizenship, as did Justice Curtis with
respect to the government's power to abolish slavery. As for federalism,
although the American system of federalism and divided sovereignty is
unique in some respects, the Justices looked extensively to international
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law to help define the powers of the several American states in horizontal
relations with each other. Finally, in the area of individual rights, members
of the Court recognized that personal rights arising from concepts such as
citizenship and due process could be informed by foreign and international
law. Aspects of the international law arguments before the Justices also
were later embraced by the Court in decisions ranging from personal juris-
diction285 to territorial governance. 286
Like domestic authority, foreign and international authority did not
necessarily yield simple answers, however. At times the Dred Scott Justices
disagreed over both the relevance and content of particular foreign sources.
Scott's citizenship posed difficult questions regarding which foreign na-
tional practices (historical and contemporary) were appropriate to consider.
The choice-of-law question confronted the Court with international and
domestic choice-of-law rules that pointed in different directions and offered
a variety of possible answers for the Justices to draw upon. Disagreements
also arose from the application of those rules to the particular facts at hand.
Where foreign or domestic law proved indeterminate, the Justices' argu-
ments focused on the fault lines within domestic and foreign authority. In
other words, the law's work in Dred Scott-including the work of foreign
authorities-ended where the argument began. Indeterminance, however, is
a factor in all forms of legal interpretation. It is not unique to international
or foreign law. 287 In short, while the use of foreign authority did not cause
the politicized opinion,. neither did it offer a panacea for the difficult task of
judging.
Second, alongside the tradition of looking to foreign law, the case ex-
hibits a parallel historical tradition of American exceptionalism, or differ-
entiating aspects of the U.S. legal system from foreign laws and practices.
All of the Justices agreed, particularly with respect to the Territory ques-
tion, that American principles of limited government and delegated powers
to some extent altered the powers of the national and state governments
285. See Pennoyerv. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729-30, 732-33 (1877).
286. E.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 285-86 (1901) (Brown, J.) (holding that "[i]f it be
once conceded that we are at liberty to acquire foreign territory, a presumption arises that our power
with respect to such territories is the same power which other nations have been accustomed to exercise
with respect to territories acquired by them"); id. at 301-02 (White, J., concurring) (asserting that the
United States largely enjoyed the powers of governance over conquered territories enjoyed by other
nations under international law). The Supreme Court in the later Insular Cases ultimately concluded
that fundamental constitutional rights did limit Congress's power on U.S. territories. Dorr v. United
States, 195 U.S. 138, 142-43 (1904).
287. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 51 (Paul Gewirtz ed., Michael
Ansaldi trans., 1989) (observing that any legal doctrine suggests "at least two opposite tendencies"); see
also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About
How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950).
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relative to those of foreign sovereigns. Chief Justice Taney emphasized
"the peculiar character of the Government of the United States" as a gov-
ernment of enumerated powers, which "does not possess all the powers
which usually belong to the sovereignty of a nation. '288 In addressing the
threshold jurisdictional questions posed by the case, both Chief Justice
Taney and Justice Daniel distinguished the limited jurisdiction of the U.S.
courts from that of the English and common law courts, and argued that
jurisdictional decisions from those foreign courts had no bearing in deter-
mining Supreme Court jurisdiction. 289
The extent of American distinctiveness, though, was unclear and at
times was hotly contested. Outside of the context of the Fugitive Slave
Clause, none of the Justices argued that the U.S. system was particularly
unique for purposes of applying international rules to the choice-of-law
question. Even with respect to the Fugitive Slave Clause, Justice Story in
Prigg had viewed the Clause as explicitly separating the U.S. from interna-
tional choice of law rules, which he believed would have allowed a juris-
diction to decline to return an escaped slave. Yet in Dred Scott, Justice
Campbell viewed that clause as incorporating a distinct international rule
that protected the reclamation of escaped slaves. Chief Justice Taney as-
serted American distinctiveness with respect to due process, even though
that concept had lengthy roots in the English common law. Justice Curtis
looked to overseas practices to inform both the nature of slavery and the
meaning of due process. In other words, all of the Justices exhibited some
transnationalist and exceptional tendencies in their struggle to identify the
appropriate relationship between the U.S. Constitution and foreign law. To
some extent, our modern debate over American exceptionalism in domestic
adjudication is d~jd vu all over again.
Strikingly, however, no Justice asserted the view now prevailing in
parts of American political and judicial discourse, that consideration of
foreign authority is never appropriate in constitutional analysis. To the
contrary, Justices on all sides of the vexing question before the Court rec-
ognized that the case posed some problems that had been confronted in
analogous contexts abroad. The question on which they differed was
whether, and to what extent, specific aspects of the Constitution differenti-
ated the United States from foreign rules and practice. The claim of excep-
tionalism was asserted on a retail basis with respect to discrete
288. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 401.
289. Id. (emphasizing the "peculiar and limited jurisdiction" of the federal courts); see also id. at
472-74 (Daniel, J., concurring) (distinguishing the "limited and special" jurisdiction of the federal
courts from common law courts in England).
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constitutional questions. No member of the Court, including Chief Justice
Taney, made the wholesale, blanket assertion that international and foreign
authority was irrelevant to constitutional analysis.
Third and finally, the disagreements within the Court demonstrate that
like the use of text or history in constitutional analysis, both the transna-
tional and the exceptionalist approaches are capable of abuse. Foreign (and
domestic) authority was egregiously abused with respect to the citizenship
question. Chief Justice Taney's references to universal opinion in the
Founding era were unsupported, and he refused to consider contrary evi-
dence regarding attitudes toward black citizenship, including evidence from
France and the Romans. He then applied a strict originalist analysis to ex-
clude any subsequent evolution in international or domestic attitudes.
Selective invocation of foreign authority is also a concern. One of the
hotly contested contemporary questions regarding the use of foreign exam-
ples is which countries count in constitutional analysis. Like the modern
Court, the members of the Taney Court looked primarily to European au-
thority as the relevant comparative example, and international law often
was equated with European, or even British, practice. The only other com-
monly invoked example was Rome. At times, little or no effort was made
to justify the selection of particular examples, or to demonstrate their rele-
vance. Nor did the Justices appear to feel that such justification was neces-
sary. With the exception of the debates over the relevance of Roman
authority, various members of the Court assumed that practices in other
European states were germane to U.S. understandings of a range of consti-
tutional and sub-constitutional questions.
But if considering foreign sources does not yield easy answers, the
Dred Scott decision is a reminder that exceptionalism also can bring abhor-
rent results. Chief Justice Taney's controversial holding that the antislavery
provisions of the Missouri Compromise violated constitutional due process
was based in part on a rigidly exceptionalist position that refused to con-
sider any viewpoints from foreign or international law, including common
law traditions at the Framing. Exceptionalism here was used to stake a
position against the prevailing international winds, which by 1857 were
blowing strongly against the institution of slavery. The decision thus under-
scores both the hazards of not considering foreign authority and the need to
use such authority responsibly.
In the end, the decision in Dred Scott demonstrates that transnational
judicial dialogue is not a phenomenon of globalization. It was a practice
well-known to the nineteenth century. The decision does not, however,
answer the vexing question of how international and foreign law appropri-
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ately interface with any particular constitutional provision, or whether a
particular constitutional rule is "exceptional" or not.290 This was a live
question before the Court, and one with which modem judges continue to
struggle.
The decision also raises complex questions about translation. There is
little question that we now have a more positivistic understanding of law
than did jurists a century and a half ago,- and'the, natural law traditions that
informed much of their writing are not widely accepted today. Our under-
standing of the judicial process and the role of judges has been transformed
as well.
While a complete examination of the translation question is beyond
the scope of this article, a few observations are warranted. Ideas of the
universality of law do appear in various aspects of the opinions. But the
members of the Dred Scott Court did not draw upon foreign authority
solely as part of a natural law tradition, nor did they look to foreign author-
ity simply because domestic law was not yet fully developed. Instead, they
looked to foreign practice where domestic law posed no clear answers and
where foreign forums with similar legal traditions had confronted analo-
gous problems. In this respect, practices from abroad were as informative
as the approaches of the several U.S. states.
The Justices also looked to foreign practices and international law be-
cause they understood that foreign law had played a role in the formation of
U.S. law and helped to give it meaning. And they looked to international
and foreign authority because they recognized that while aspects of Ameri-
can law were exceptional, the United States and the several states were
nevertheless governments operating in an ordered international system.
International law thus established rules that governed the behavior of na-
tions and the several states. In short, foreign law and international law were
relevant for their persuasive value. But international law was also informa-
tive as a set of binding legal norms regarding the powers of governments
and their relation to personal rights.
CONCLUSION
In the end, it appears that the prevailing criticism of the use of foreign
and international authority in Dred Scott is misplaced. It was not considera-
tion of foreign authority that led the Court to reach a "political" decision,
nor did the use of foreign authority in the case reflect "efforts to impose
290. 1 have offered some threshold guidelines for confronting these questions elsewhere. See
Cleveland, supra note 14.
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foreign morals on the American people in the guise of interpreting the Con-
stitution .... -"291 The Dred Scott case suggests that American judges a
century and a half ago were familiar with the possibility of American ex-
ceptionalism and with the idea of commonality between American constitu-
tional law and "foreign" law. They recognized both that American law
might be distinctive from that of the international community and that as-
pects of American law were illuminated by international norms. Undoubt-
edly, the Justices were attempting to answer an intensely politically
charged question, and the members of the Court were engaged in a strug-
gle, not only over the future of the American Union, but over the soul of
the Constitution. Their struggle in some sense was an intensely modern one
over the extent to which that document mirrored or distinguished foreign
experience.
291. Calabresi & Zimdahl, supra note 16, at 878-79.
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